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THE 1978 JAMES McCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND REPUTATION
RICHARD A. POSNER*

n a recent article I attempted to analyze privacy from the standpoint of economics.' Because the subject of privacy is a large
and difficult one that had never been approached from an economic
angle, the article was necessarily incomplete. The present article
carries the analysis forward in a number of areas covered inadequately or not at all in the previous one. That article was limited
to the concept of privacy as concealment of facts and communications. This one considers several other aspects of privacy-for example, the desire for seclusion that may lead a person to resent
telephone solicitations even if the caller makes no effort to extract
private information from him. The present article also tries to
establish some empirical foundations for the economic analysis of
privacy. Further, it extends the analysis to defamation. Blackening
another's reputation by means of false accusations is closely related
to enhancing one's own reputation by concealing discreditable
facts about oneself-which the first article argued is an important
motivation for seeking privacy. The present article also attempts
(1) to explain the rash of state statutes dealing with privacy in
credit and in employment and (2) to analyze the role of government
both as a possessor of privacy and as an invader of the privacy of
its citizens. These two parts of the article are highly tentative, however.
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member, Senior Research Staff, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago. This paper, a revised and amplified version of the Mitchell Lecture
given at Buffalo Law School on November 1, 1978, is part of a larger project with George
Stigler on the economics of privacy, conducted under the auspices of the Center for the
Study of the Economy and the State. I wish to thank Robert Bourgeois, for valuable research assistance; Paul Bator, Gary Becker, Gerhard Casper, Richard Epstein, Charles Fried,
Claire Friedland, John Hause, R.H. Helmholz, Anthony Kronman, William Landes, George
Stigler, Geoffrey Stone, and participants in the Applications of Economics workshop at the
University of Chicago, for helpful comments on previous drafts; and Julius Kirschner and
John Langbein, for historical advice.
1. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. Rav. 393 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Right of Privacy]. An abbreviated version of the article that contains, however, some additional material on privacy legislation appears in REGULATION, May/June 1978, at 19, under
the title An Economic Theory of Privacy.
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY

There is an extensive literature on privacy. Although primarily
the work of lawyers such as Brandeis, Bloustein, Fried, and Prosser,
and the political scientist Westin,2 historians, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and philosophers have also contributed to it.8
However, like my first article on privacy, this one, for better or for
worse, owes little to the previous literature on privacy. Its provenance is the economic analysis of nonmarket behavior, pioneered
by Gary Becker; 4 the economic analysis of law, a field partly derivative from Becker's work on racial discrimination, crime, marriage,
and other areas of nonmarket behavior and partly an independent
field growing out of work by Calabresi, Coase, and others;' and the
economics of information.6
Thanks to Becker, the sorts of things one talks about in a discussion of privacy, such as gossip, prying, "self-advertising," slander,
and seclusion, are now considered to be at least potentially within
the domain of economics. But since, with minor exceptions, privacy has not been the subject of economic analysis, 7 I have had to
attempt such analysis myself. A conclusion stressed in my previous
article is that secrecy is entitled to legal protection where it is necessary to protect an investment in the acquisition of socially valuable
information, but not where it serves to conceal facts about an individual that, if known to others, would cause them to lower their
valuation of him as an employee, borrower, friend, spouse, or other
transactor.8 Although this conclusion may seem normative, its main
purpose is different. It is to help us understand privacy-related behavior and the legal reaction thereto. For example, an economic
theory of privacy sets the stage for an empirical test of the hypothesis that the common law is best explained as an effort (how2. This literature is reviewed in Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 406-09.
3. See, e.g., D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1972); Shils, Privacy:
Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 281 (1966); Thomson, The
Right to Privacy, 4 PnL. & PUB. ArF. 295 (1975).
4. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAViOR (1976).
5. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Hirshleifer, Where Are We in the Theory of Information?, 63 Am. EcON.
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 31 (1973).
7. Greenawalt and Noam have discussed business privacy; see reference and criticism
in Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 405-06. Two studies define privacy (very narrowly) as
an individual or nuclear family living alone and find that it has risen very rapidly since
World War II. See Beresford & Rivlin, Privacy, Poverty, and Old Age, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 247
(1966); R. MICHAEL, V. FUCHS & S. ScoTr, CHANGES IN HOUSEHOLD LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
1950-1976 (Working Paper No. 262, Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res., July 1978).
8. See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 394-404.
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ever unwitting) by the judges to formulate rules that maximize
economic efficiency. 9 My previous article found the common law of
privacy to be generally congruent with the economics of the problem, 10 and the present article makes the same finding with regard
to the common law of defamation.11
II.

THE ETYMOLOGY

OF THE

TERm

"PRIVACY"

The term "privacy" is notoriously difficult to define. My previous article elided the definitional problem by concentrating on
just one aspect of privacy, the concealment of private information
(including communications). This approach misses some insights
that a consideration of the full range of meanings of the term
privacy affords.
The original meaning of the word "private" was nonpublic in
the sense of uninvolved in matters of state. 2 Its root, moreover, is
the same as that of words like "privation" and "deprivation."
Originally, to be uninvolved in public affairs was to be deprived
and it would not in those days have been a compliment (as it is in
some quarters today) to call someone a "very private person." This
etymology is a clue to an important if controversial point: the concept of privacy, in anything like the senses in which we use it today, is a Western cultural artifact. The idea that it might be
pleasant to be off the public stage was hardly meaningful in a
society in which physical privacy was essentially nonexistent-was
not only prohibitively costly, but also extremely dangerous. Privacy
3
was then the lot of the pariah.'
Gradually the word "private" lost its unfavorable connotations, probably because the growth in the differentiation of institutions and in wealth and public order made it both economically
feasible and physically safe for people to have a measure (though
initially a very small one) of physical privacy. By the 17th century
we find a concept of privacy as withdrawal from the cares of public
life through physical removal to a secluded garden or country
9. A thesis developed in R. POSNER, supra note 5, especially parts I and VI.
10. See Right of Privacy, supranote 1, at 409-21.

11. See part V infra.
12. See VIII OxFoa

ENGLISH DiCrIoNARY 1388

(1933)

("privacy"). See also Shils,

supra note 3 (discussion of the history of privacy).
13. The original sense of "private" is, incidentally, a clue to the undifferentiated
character of primitive institutions. The public and private sectors are not distinct in early

societies. One can view these societies as prepolitical or pregovernmental, but equally one
can view them as lacking a dearly defined "private sector."
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estate. This aspect of privacy may be called "seclusion." Its outstanding characteristic is a reduction in the number of social interactions. An equivalent term is "retirement" in its complex modern
sense in which we speak of a person being "retiring" and also of a
person being "retired."
The sense of privacy as seclusion has been immensely influential in the privacy literature; it is, for example, the sense in which
Brandeis and Warren used the term in their famous article on
privacy. 4 Yet it is actually a rather archaic concept, belonging to
the period when physical privacy was very limited-when people
lived in such crowded conditions 15 that to get some privacy required
withdrawal to an isolated spot of countryside. The opportunities
for physical privacy are so much greater in modern society that
few people any longer crave the solitude of Walden Pond. The
enormous growth of physical privacy was overlooked by Brandeis
and Warren when they wrote (well before the era of electronic
eavesdropping) that modern man had less privacy than his forebears.
Seclusion can, however, be given a broader meaning than the
kind of fastidious withdrawal suggested in the Brandeis and Warren article. The word "retire" is again helpful in expressing my
meaning. One can "retire" from the cares of life to some pastoral
retreat; or one can "retire" to one's study to write an article or to
plan a sales campaign. Retirement in the first sense implies a reduction in social interactions and therefore in market and nonmarket production; but retirement in the second sense is, on the
contrary, part of the creative or preparatory stage of production.
To illustrate the distinction, one can resent telephone solicitations
either because one does not like to have anything to do with people
or because one is engaged in, or preparing for, a more valuable
social interaction than the telephone solicitor has to offer. The
word "seclusion" does not have quite the right connotations for
the interest in occasional peace and quiet that I have just described,
but to avoid multiplying terms I shall use it to embrace both reducing and improving one's social interactions.
The vocal modern demand for privacy has little to do with
either a craving for solitude that arose in the past from a combina.
14. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HT-iv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
15. On the paradox of crowding in eras or areas of low population density, see note

57 infra.
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tion of the lack of physical privacy in the home and the pacification
of the surrounding countryside, or the need of people, especially
those engaged in cerebral activity, for some peace and quiet, a need
in general adequately fulfilled by the abundant physical privacy
of modern Western life. What people want more of today when
they decry lack of privacy is mainly something quite different:
they want more concealment of information about themselves that
others might use to their disadvantage. 16 It is this meaning of

privacy that, for example, underlies.the federal Privacy Act, 17 which
limits the retention and dissemination of discrediting personal information contained in government files. I want to emphasize how
far this sense of privacy is from its early meanings up to and including the idea of seclusion stressed by Brandeis and Warren.
The case for privacy in the sense of concealment of personal
information is different from and generally weaker than the case
for allowing people who want to reduce their social interactions to
choose a "retiring" mode of life; and it is much weaker than the
second sense of seclusion that I have noted. It is to be regretted
therefore that advocates of a broad right of privacy in the sense of
secrecy have conflated the two concepts, seclusion and secrecy. They
have sought to appropriate the favorable connotations that privacy
enjoys in the expression "a very private person" to support the
right to conceal one's criminal record from an employer. Yet they
have not protested against expansive interpretations of the first
amendment that sanction invasions of real seclusion, for example by
Jehovah's Witnesses' sound trucks.'8 As Professor Freund pointed
out some years ago, "On the whole, the active proselytizing interests have been given greater sanctuary than the quiet virtues or the
right of privacy."' 9 The modern privacy advocates want concealment rather than peace and quiet.
Concealment is closely related to another concept and the
16. For an elaboration of this view of privacy, see Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at
394-97, 399-400.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1976).
18. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating under the first amendment an ordinance making
it unlawful for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity when the screen
,is visible from a public street). But cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S.
728 (1970) (upholding a federal statute authorizing recipient of a "pandering advertisement" to instruct the Post Office to inform the sender that he is not to mail such material

to the recipient in the future).
19. P. FREUND, Tim SuPRxmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS
AND PERFORMANcE 40 (1961).

BUSINESS, PURPOSES,
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linkage indicates the continuity between defamation and invasion
of privacy as torts. I refer to "reputation." A person's reputation
is other people's valuation of him as a trading, social, marital, or
other kind of partner. An asset potentially of great value, it can be
damaged both by false and by true defamation. These possibilities
are the basis of the individual's incentive both to seek redress
against untruthful libels and slanders and to conceal true discrediting information about himself-the former being the domain of
the defamation tort and the latter of the privacy tort. The concept
of reputation is not similarly intertwined with that of privacy as
seclusion. Indeed, to an individual who is seeking to reduce his
interactions with other people, what other people think of him as
a candidate for various interactions is of reduced significance.
I conclude my discussion of etymology with three observations.
First, the modern approbation for privacy has not gone unchallenged. Critics of a collectivist persuasion rename privacy "anxious
privatism" and contrast it with traits of openness, candor, and
altruism allegedly encouraged by a more communal style of living.20 This criticism has value in reminding us that privacy is a
cultural artifact rather than an innate human need. Most cultures
have functioned tolerably well without either the concept or the
reality of privacy in either its seclusion or secrecy senses, 21 and this
fact must be weighed before one concludes that privacy is a precondition to valued human qualities such as love and friendship, let
alone (as sometimes argued) a prerequisite of sanity.22
Second, the conventional literature on privacy is almost entirely concerned with the privacy of individuals rather than that
of organizations such as business corporations. Moreover, only a
limited subset of the individual's activities are thought relevant to
the analysis of privacy. In particular, his entrepreneurial activities
are ignored. Yet we shall see that the claim to a legally protected
right of secrecy is very strong where, for example, the individual
is seeking to conceal his true opinion of the value of some commodity involved in a transaction. The common law has long recog20. This is the view of the "humanistic psychology" movement. See Rotenberg,
"Alienating Individualism" and "Reciprocal Individualism": A Cross-Cultural Concep.
tualization, 17 J. HvAmurSTIc Psrcn. 3 (1977). See also Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in
the Good Life, in Nomos xii: PRIvAcY 88, 89-93 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).

21. However, some minimal level of physical privacy may be necessary for material
progress. See text following note 60 infra.
22.

See Right of Privacy,supra note 1, at 408-09.

1979)]

PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND REPUTATION

nized this claim, as well as the cognate claim of the corporate
entrepreneur.
The arbitrary limitations placed on the domain of privacy in
much modern discussion suggest an effort to change people's views
by redefining terms. Another example is found in the area of constitutional adjudication. The Supreme Court has erected a constitutional doctrine of "sexual privacy" that, for example, forbids
states to ban the sale of contraceptives to married couples or to
forbid abortions during the first three months of pregnancy. 3
Whatever the merits, constitutional or otherwise, of this doctrine,
it does considerable
violence to the usual meaning of the term
"privacy." 24
Third, it is important to distinguish the concept of physical
privacy: it refers to the conditions of life, not purely architectural,
that afford people a greater or lesser measure of distance from
others. Doors, private apartments, unattached single-family houses,
and private automobiles facilitate privacy in the less tangible senses
of seclusion or secrecy. So do broader social conditions such as
urbanization and occupational mobility, which, by reducing repetitive contacts between people, also reduce opportunities for
observation, imposition, and other intrusions. Modern advances in
electronic surveillance operate in the opposite direction. Although
they probably do not use electronic eavesdropping, modern communards, as part of their efforts to reduce privacy and individuality,
are careful to remove the physical preconditions of privacy, some25
times including doors!
III.

SOME ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY

A.

Seclusion
Privacy, as noted, began to lose its negative connotations when
the countryside was pacified, so that individuals, who lived in
23. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

24. Professor Bloustein approves this usage, apparently equating "privacy" with
"personal liberty." Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor
Posner's Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. Rav. 429, 447 (1978). In Bloustein's hands, the word

"privacy" seems in danger of losing any useful meaning it may once have had. On the

elastic quality of the term in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Note, Toward a Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87 YALE L.J.

1579 (1978).
25. The faculty offices at Governors State University, in Park Forest South, Illinois,
have, I am told, neither doors nor ceilings, because such barriers to sight and sound would

be inconsistent with the university's fundamental policy of "openness."
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crowded conditions, could occasionally seek solitude, retreat, seclusion, and retirement from their busy everyday lives. The desire for
seclusion is at first glance difficult to understand in instrumental
terms, as an input into or investment in an activity. It seems, rather,
an end in itself, an aspect of consumption or taste-and to label a
preference a "taste" is to confess that it has no economic explanation. Nor is a convincing psychological explanation available. A
taste for solitude cannot be regarded as a precondition for sanity
or even happiness, for at most times and in most places people have
lacked it. It is only very recently, taking the whole course of human
evolution, that it was safe for people to be alone for even short
periods of time. Even today, while intellectuals may like to think
of themselves as leading or wanting to lead retired, contemplative
lives, the vast mass of people continue, by preference, to live, work,
travel, recreate, and be entertained, in groups; even when "alone,"
the average person will usually be listening to the radio or watching television. Most solitude is involuntary, and mental illness is
associated with solitude rather than its absence.2
The association between solitude and intellectuality suggests,
however, that the demand for at least limited solitude or seclusion,
as distinct from the desire to lead a permanently reclusive life, may
have an instrumental interpretation after all. People whose work
is mental rather than physical require a more tranquil environment than others, and this will often entail greater solitude.2
Further, as we are about to see, a creator of ideas will often seek
secrecy in order to enable him to appropriate the social benefits of
his creations; and secrecy often requires solitude. Finally, some
measure of seclusion is necessary to assure privacy of communication, an important aspect of privacy that is discussed below.
As a detail, it may be noted that if there is a taste for solitude
as an end in itself it is a selfish emotion in a precise economic sense
that can be assigned to the concept of selfishness. Solitary activity
(or cessation of activity) benefits only the actor. Work, and nonmarket interactions such as love, child care, and even casual socializing, confer benefits on others. Production for the market yields
consumer surplus, while nonmarket interactive activities presum26. See, e.g., Cooper & Green, Coping with Occupational Stress Among Royal Air
ForcePersonnel on Isolated Island Bases, 39 PSYcH. REP. 731 (1976).
27. This point, made to me by George Stigler, has implications for explaining the
secular trend in privacy, discussed at text accompanying note 52 infra.
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ably yield a form of nonmarket consumer surplus. 28 In an important sense, therefore, the person who works is "unselfish" no matter
how exclusively motivated by greed he is. But the individual who
retires from the world, like the lazy man (who trades market income for a reduction in the disutility of work), reduces his contribution to the wealth of the other people in the society. It is the
antimarket bias of the modern intellectual that has made the term
"private person" one of approbation rather than of opprobrium.
The desire for "privacy" need have nothing to do, however,
with wanting to be an anchorite or even with wanting just some
peace and quiet. Often people want privacy in order to manipulate
other people by concealing from them aspects of their character,
prospects, or past that would if known reduce their opportunities to
engage in advantageous market or nonmarket transactions. 29 But
that is not always true, and I want first to examine an important
instance where privacy is desired for reasons neither reclusive nor
manipulative. This is the case of "innovation."
B.

Innovation
As is well known, there is a problem in obtaining the right
amount of information in a free-market system. Once information
is produced, its prompt appropriation by others is easy because of
the public character of information, but such appropriation prevents the original producer of the information, the innovator, from
recouping his investment in its production. There are two methods
of overcoming this problem that are compatible with a market
system as usually understood. The first is the explicit creation of
property rights in information, as in the patent and copyright laws.
The second is secrecy. The information is used by the producer
but not disclosed until he has had a chance to profit from his exclusive possession.
The choice between these methods of fostering the production
of socially valuable information depends on a weighing of the
relative costs and benefits of the two methods in particular circumstances. On the benefit side, compare statutory and common law
28. For example, the "output" of a social game of tennis is presumably greater than
the opportunity costs (or prices) of the activity to the players. Each player confers a net
benefit on the other. See Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AMt. J. Soc. 597 (1958),
for a sociological perspective on the element of "trade" involved in nonmarket social
behavior.
29. The analogy to fraud in the sale of goods should be evident.
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copyright. Statutory copyright gives the author or publisher a
property right in his work: no one may copy it without his authorization. Common law copyright used the method of secrecy:
so long as the author did not publish his manuscript the law would
protect him against unauthorized dissemination by othersA Obviously, the method of secrecy would be self-defeating for the author who wanted to publish his work, or where the practice of an
invention immediately disclosed the embodied innovation. And
even where secrecy would afford some protection (a publisher
might earn substantial revenues before a pirate edition could be
printed and distributed), it might be an extremely costly method
of protection; it might entail, for example, accelerated, secretive
book publication at higher costs than if the publisher had a property right in the published work. As a further example, a secret
process might have valuable applications in another industry yet
the owner of the process might be afraid to sell it because the secret
might get out to his competitors.
Property rights are not, however, always the best method of
enabling private appropriation of the social benefits of information.
The legal costs of enforcing a property right are sometimes disproportionate to the value of the information sought to be protected: the patent system could not be used to protect a popular
host's dinner recipes. Often what may be termed the "tracing"
costs of information preclude reliance on a property-right system.
If ideas as such, as distinct from the sorts of concretely embodied
ideas that the patent and copyright laws in fact protect, could be
patented or copyrighted, the scope of, and the difficulty of determining, infringement would be excessive. For these and other
reasons secrecy is an important social instrument for encouraging
the production of information (especially, as we shall see, in settings where the formal rights system in intellectual property is
undeveloped). Many examples come to mind. The shrewd bargainer
who conceals from the other party to a negotiation his true opinion
of the value of the object of the transaction is legitimately engaged
in appropriating the social benefit of superior knowledge of market
30. Common law copyright was not simply an aspect of trespass law. If A, being lawfully on B's premises, made a xerox copy of B's manuscript but did not remove or damage
the manuscript, there was no theft or conversion but there was an infringement of B's
common law copyright.
The recent revision of the copyright law provides statutory protection from the time
when the work is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 1976 Copyright Act, 17

U.s.c. § 102 (a).
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values; and so with the large purchaser of some company's stock
who places a lot of small orders under false names so that his activity will convey less information to the sellers that they have
undervalued the stock.31 Secrecy is the indispensable method of
protecting not only the speculator's investment in obtaining information vital to the prompt adjustment of markets to changed
conditions, but also the investment in information both of the
great chef and of the housewife who "buys" the esteem of her
friends with her imaginative cooking. The lawyer work product
doctrine is best understood as the use of secrecy to protect the
lawyer's (and hence client's) investment in research and analysis of
a case.
C.

Concealment of Personal Facts
In speaking of privacy as seclusion and as innovation, I have
had no occasion to bring into the discussion reputation, the opinion
in which someone is held by others as a candidate with whom to
transact either socially or commercially. A good reputation implies
that people are eager to transact with the individual, and a bad one
that they are averse to transacting with him. Reputation affects the
individual's wealth by determining the terms that people will offer
him in transactions. Thus, withdrawal, temporary or permanent,
from society is normally not motivated by a desire to enhance
reputation. To take the extreme case, the recluse has little use for
a reputation. Nor does the inventor seek "privacy" (secrecy) for
the purpose of creating or enhancing a reputation. In contrast, the
third sense of privacy that I am interested in explicating-privacy
as the concealment of discreditable facts about oneself-is closely
related to reputation, for it is a method (though not the only or
even the most effective method) of enhancing reputation.
People do not conceal a criminal past because they desire
seclusion or because if they reveal their past they will be impeded
in reaping the fruits of innovative activity. They conceal it in
order to secure a good reputation. This point is obvious enough
in the parallel case of a producer who conceals the dismal safety
record of his product. The individual who hides a history of mental
illness or some other relevant health defect from his employer,
31. A single very large purchase of stock is less likely to be a random event than
many small purchases, which may well represent portfolio adjustments unmotivated by
superior information.
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family, and friends, or a history of bankruptcies from his creditors,
or tastes, eccentricities, opinions, attitudes, and the like that if
known would impair his reputation among friends and acquaintances is engaged in the same kind of activity as a producer who
conceals defects in his product. Only the modern intellectual's
prejudice against market activity makes this a startling equation. 2
It may be objected that many of the facts that people conceal
(homosexuality, ethnic origins, aversions, sympathy toward Communism or fascism, minor mental illnesses, early scrapes with the
law, marital discord, nose picking, or whatever) would if revealed
provoke "irrational" reactions by prospective employers, friends,
creditors, lovers, and so on. But this objection overlooks the opportunity costs of shunning people for stupid reasons, or, stated otherwise, the gains to be had from dealing with someone whom others
shun irrationally. If ex-convicts are good workers but most employers do not know this, employers who do know it will be able to hire
them at a below-average wage because of their depressed job opportunities and will thereby obtain a competitive advantage over
the bigots. In a diverse, decentralized, and competitive society such
as ours, one can expect irrational shunning to be weeded out over
time.33
A commercial analogy will help to bring out this point. For
many years the Federal Trade Commission required importers of
certain products, especially products made in Japan, to label the
product with the country of origin. The reason was a widespread
belief, whose rationality the Commission was not prepared to confirm or deny, that certain foreign (especially Japanese) goods were
inferior. Also, there was believed to be some residual anger over
Pearl Harbor. But, as is well known, Japanese products proved
themselves in the marketplace, the prejudice against them waned
and eventually disappeared, and today Japanese origin is a proudly
displayed sign of quality and good value. This is an example of
how competition can over time dispel prejudice. It is an example
from commerce, but a similar example, this one involving JapaneseAmerican people rather than Japanese products, is available to
32. On the contemporary tendency to favor the enhancement of liberty in the personal sphere and its suppression in the economic sphere, see Director, The Parity of the
Economic Market Place, 7 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1964), and Coase, The Market for Goods and
the Market for Ideas, 64 Am. ECON. Rxv. PAP'm & PROCEEDINGS 384 (1974).
33. This process has been analyzed extensively in the context of racial discrimination
(see, e.g., G. BECK R, TnE ECONOMICS OF DxsCnuMINATVON (2d ed. 1971); Demsetz, Minorities
in the Market Place, 43 N.G.L. REv. 271 (1965)), but would seem to be equally at work in
the case of discrimination against convicts, homosexuals, etc.
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illustrate the competitive process at work in the realm of employment and personal relationships.
The different treatment of past criminal conduct in the law
of torts and the law of evidence provides an oblique insight into
this point. Save in California, there is no right of action against
someone who publicizes an individual's criminal record, no matter
how far in the past the crime occurred; 34 however, the use of past
crimes to impeach the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial is
limited (in the judge's discretion) to relatively recent crimes. 5 In
both cases, it is arguable that people can be trusted to discount negative personal information by its recency. But in the tort case the
people doing the discounting-friends and acquaintances, creditors,
employers, and other actual and potential transactors-pay a price,
in lost opportunities for advantageous transactions, if they attach
undue weight to information about the remote past. Thus they
have an incentive not to react irrationally to such information.
Jurors, in contrast, incur no cost from behaving irrationally;
the market approach analogy fails, and a paternalistic approach to
the question of the rationality of their decisions may therefore be
warranted.
Irrationalprejudices-the sort of thing a market system will
tend to weed out-must not be confused with acting on incomplete
information. The rational individual or firm will terminate search
at the point where the marginal gain in knowledge from additional
inquiry is just equal to the marginal cost (in time or whatever).
Consequently, if the value of transacting with one individual rather
than another is small or the cost of additional information great,
the process of rational search may terminate at a very early stage,
as some would judge it. If ex-convicts have on average poor employment records, if the cost of correcting this average judgment
for the individual ex-convict applying for a job is high, and if
substitute employees without criminal records are available at not
much higher wages, it may be rational for an employer to adopt a
flat rule of not employing anyone who has a criminal record. 36
34.
35.

See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 415-16.
See C. MCCORMIcKic, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972).

36. See text accompanying notes 99-100 inlra.Notice how the existence of minimumwage laws retards the process by which members of different groups obtain access to the
employment market. This observation invites the familiar argument that public intervention is warranted to correct the consequences of a previous ill-advised intervention. But
the new intervention may turn out, in implementation, to be ill-advised too. For this
reason, government's previous failures provide a feeble basis for urging still more public
intervention.
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There is no evidence that people are generally less rational
about how far to carry their search for employees, spouses, friends,
and so forth than they are in the activities that we leave to the
market (indeed employment is one of those activities). A growing
empirical literature on nonmarket behavior, including marriage,
procreation, and crime, finds that people behave as rationally in
these areas as do firms and consumers in explicit markets. 87 These
findings argue for allowing market principles to determine the
weight to be given the sorts of discrediting information that people
seek to conceal. The market approach suggests in turn that whatever rules governing fraud are deemed optimal in ordinary product
markets ought in principle to apply equally in labor markets, credit
markets, and "markets" for purely personal relationships as well.
Thus, if economic analysis would classify refusal to disclose a particular type of fact as fraudulent in the market for goods, such refusal should equally be classified as fraudulent when made by
someone seeking a job, a personal loan, or a wife. Annulment of a
marriage because of fraud is thus a strict analogue to rescission of a
fraudulent commercial contract. Of course, in many areas of personal relations the costs of fraud are too slight to warrant formal
legal remedies.
The concept of privacy as manipulation requires, however,
qualification in several respects.
1. Concealment sometimes serves, paradoxically, the function
(which is distinct from the innovation function of secrecy discussed
earlier) of promoting rather than impeding the flow of accurate information. At any moment a person's mind is likely to be brimming
over with vagrant, half-formed, and ill-considered thoughts that, if
revealed to others, would provide less information about his intentions and capacities than the thoughts he chooses to express in
speech. Concealing one's "inner thoughts" is just the other side of
selecting certain thoughts for utterance and by doing so communicating one's intentions and values. Similarly, wearing clothes serves
not merely to protect one against the elements but also to make a
public statement about one's values and tastes. If we went around
naked, babbling the first thing that came into our minds, we would
be revealing less of ourselves than we do by dressing carefully and
37. See G.

BECKER,

supra note 4, Introduction, and studies cited in note 55 infra.

The absence of a minimum wage in the nonmarket sector is a factor favoring the weeding
out of irrational antipathies in that sector. Cf. note 36 supra.
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speaking with reticence. Social interaction would be retarded rather
than facilitated 8 This is not the point, which has no obvious economic interpretation, that hypocrisy is the essential lubricant of
social relations. If A values B as a potential business associate, telling B he looks like a frog will obscure rather than elucidate his sincere view of B-which is that he values him as a potential business
associate.3 9
The borderland between concealment as information and as
misrepresentation is illustrated by the dyeing of hair. The purpose
may be to communicate something about what kind of person one
is or it may be to conceal one's age. That clothing, adornment, cosmetics, accent, and the like serve not only to communicate but also
to misrepresent may conceivably explain some of the sporadic efforts to regulate luxury in dress. In the 14th century:
Nothing was more resented by the hereditary nobles than the imitation of their clothes and manners by the upstarts, thus obscuring
the lines between the eternal orders of society. Magnificence in
clothes was considered a prerogative of nobles, who should be
identifiable by modes of dress forbidden to others. In the effort to
establish this principle as law and prevent "outrageous and excessive apparel of diverse people against their estate and degree,"
sumptuary laws were repeatedly announced, attempting to fix what
kinds of clothes people might wear and how much they might
spend.40
2. Concealment sometimes serves a legitimate self-help function. An example is a rich man's concealing his income because he
fears that he might be a target for kidnappers. This motive is to be
distinguished from wanting to conceal one's income from creditors,
adult family members, and the tax collector.
3. Any concept of concealment as misrepresentation must, by
analogy to commercial misrepresentation, incorporate some notion
of materiality. People may, for reasons imperfectly understood (or
at least not illuminated by economics), assiduously conceal facts
about themselves that if known would not affect their social interactions; some of the traditional (and declining) reticence about
38. To be sure, this analysis does not explain why a woman might not want a
stranger to watch her giving birth. See De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146
(1881), discussed in Bloustein, supra note 24, at 443. The explanation may be genetic (cf.
E. WisON, SOCOmOLOGY: Tim NEw SYTrI-sIsas 320 (1975)); it does not seem to be economic.

39. If the above analysis is correct, efforts to improve social interactions through
nudism, extreme frankness of speech, and other fashionable techniques of group therapy
seem fundamentally confused.
40. B. TUCHmiAN, A DIsrAr MIRROR: THE CALAmrrous 14TH CENmUR 19 (1978).
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nudity has this character.41 No efficiency interest is promoted by
requiring disclosure of the immaterial concealed fact. By the same
token, there is little demand for such disclosures.
4. The competitive provision of information may sometimes
lead to its overproduction from an efficiency standpoint. 42 For example, some advertising serves partly or even mainly to offset a
rival firm's advertising. This point is equally applicable to truthful
signaling through dress, manners, and other forms of self-advertising. Even where the signal is true, the effort of each individual to
signal loud and clear may result in producing more information
about personal characteristics than is optimal. But with self-advertising, as with advertising itself, it is easier to note the problem
than to suggest a sensible solution. Nevertheless, the dress codes
occasionally found in business firms and private schools, though
ostensibly intended to raise the standard of dress, may sometimes
produce the opposite result. Limiting variety in dress reduces the
amount of resources devoted to this form of self-advertising.
Thus far I have been discussing the case of a good reputation
that is founded on fraud and hence is vulnerable to being harmed
by truth. But, equally, the possessor of a deservedly good reputation is vulnerable to being harmed by falsehood. It is in this sense
that the tort of defamation and the tort of invasion of privacy are
closely related. While the courts in defamation cases, as we shall
see, are concerned with protecting good reputations from damaging
falsehoods, the courts in privacy cases spend much of their time
fending off efforts of people to get compensation for the destruction of an undeservedly good reputation by exposure of discreditable facts about them. The circumscribed nature of the privacy
tort relative to that of defamation is evidence not that the judges
have been hidebound and obtuse but that they have recognized
the fundamental difference between the claim to privacy in the
form in which it is usually asserted and the claim to be free from
defamation.
The falsehood that damages a deservedly good reputation
creates the same sort of harm that the concealment of discrediting
information does. When the individual is shunned because he is
41. Such reticence seems to be of comparatively recent origin, even in Western culture. On medieval European attitudes toward nudity, see N. EmAs, THE CivIUZING PoCas
163-65 (E. Jephcott trans. 1978).
42. See -irshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to
Inventive Activity, 61 Am. ECON. RiEv. 561 (1971).
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falsely believed to have a criminal record, socially advantageous
transactions are forgone. The analogy in the commercial world is
the disparagement of a competitor's goods. False disparagement
causes consumers to shun transactions that would increase their
welfare. Indeed, the false disparager, whether of goods or persons,
occupies a position parallel to that of the individual who conceals
discrediting information about himself: both use falsehood to
divert transactions to themselves from substitute transactors who,
if the truth were known, would be preferred.
D.

Communications
The privacy of communications requires separate consideration. In one sense, a communication (letter, phone call, face-to-face
conversation, or whatever) is simply a medium by which facts are
(selectively) disclosed. It might seem, therefore, that if the facts are
the sort for which secrecy is desired in order to enable innovation,
the communication should be privileged, and if they are discrediting it should not be. But this approach is too simple. Besides revealing facts about the speaker (or listener), a communication will
often refer to third parties. If they were privy to it the speaker
would take this fact into account and modify the communication.
The modification would be costly both in time (for deliberation)
and in reduction of the clarity of the communication. For example,
if A in conversation with B disparages C, and C overhears the conversation, C is likely to be angry or upset. If A does not want to
engender this reaction in C, as well he might not (because he likes
C or because C may retaliate for the disparagement), then, knowing that C might be listening, he will avoid the disparagement. He
will choose his words more carefully and the added deliberateness
and obliqueness of the conversation will reduce its communication
value and increase its cost. To be sure, there is an offsetting benefit
if the disparagement is false and damaging to C. But there is no
reason to believe that on average more false than true disparagements are made in private conversations; and the true are as likely
to be deterred by the prospect of publicity as the false. If A derives
no substantial benefit from correctly observing to B that C is a liar
but stands only to incur C's wrath, the knowledge that C might
overhear the conversation may induce A to withhold information
that might be valuable to B. This is the reason for, among other
things, the practice of according anonymity to referees of articles
submitted to scholarly journals.
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A related point is that eavesdropping is not a very efficient way
of finding out facts (say, A's opinion of C). If the danger of eavesdropping is known, conversations will be modified, at some social
cost, to reduce their informational content for third parties. The
parallel in nonconversational information would be the man who,
having a criminal record that the law does not entitle him to conceal, goes to great lengths to avoid its discovery by changing his
name, his place of work and residence, and perhaps even his physical appearance. If the principal effect of refusing to recognize property rights in discrediting information about the individual were
simply to call forth an expenditure on some costly but effective
method of covering one's tracks, the social gains would be small,
and could be negative. The principal effect of allowing eavesdropping would not be to make the rest of society more informed about
the individual but to make conversations more cumbersome and
less effective.
The distinction is developed in Figure 1. D is the schedule of
marginal private benefits to the individual from the activity of concealing material facts about himself. S is the schedule of marginal
costs to him of this concealment. He carries his output of the activity
to the point q, where the two curves intersect. If we assume, first, that
the benefits to the individual are exactly equal to the costs to those
from whom he conceals material facts about himself (i.e., that the
benefits are a series of transfers from them to him) and, second, that
these transfers are eventually transformed into equivalent social
costs, 43 then the social costs of the activity are the entire area under
the D curve to the left of q. Assume that some change in law or technology occurs that makes it somewhat more costly for the individual
to conceal material facts about himself. The effect is to shift S upward
to S' (a proportionately equal shift in the supply curve is assumed).
The result is a small decline in the activity and hence in its social
costs. If, however, the event that shifts the supply curve-say, the
introduction of indiscriminate wiretapping-imposes costs on socially productive as well as socially unproductive activity, costs not
shown in the diagram, the net social benefits of the change could
well be negative.
But now suppose that S shifts upward as the result of a change
43. The usual assumption in the economics-of-crime literature. See Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECoN 169, 171 n.3 (1968); Tullock,
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224 (1967).
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in law or technology that, unlike wiretapping, cannot be offset by
moderate additional expenditures by the individual seeking concealment (an example might be the establishment of a very efficient
nationwide credit bureau). This shift is depicted by S" in Figure 1.
The reduction in the scale of the concealment activity brought
about by this shift is very great and the resulting reduction in the
social cost of the activity is likely to outweigh any negative externalities.

Fig.1

The shift from S to S' is (at a guess) the effect on the amount
of concealment of personal facts of allowing eavesdropping, and
the shift from S to S" that of refusing to recognize a property right
in personal information such as a criminal record or a history of
mental illness. The costs of concealing the past are higher than
those of using indirectness in speech and rise rapidly with the scale
of the activity, as represented by the slope of S". When Thomas
Eagleton was nominated for Vice-President on the Democratic Party
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ticket in 1972, there was no way he could have concealed his history of mental illness, but he could have concealed his opinions of
third parties in a regime of conversational publicity.44
The Legal Protection of Privacy, With Special Reference to
Confidential Relationships

E.

I have identified several areas where secrecy appears to promote social welfare. The question arises as to the nature of the legal
protection accorded secrecy in these areas. Suppose A in conversation with B slanders C, B repeats the slander to C, and C sues A
for defamation. Has A the right to sue B to recover any damages
paid out to C, on the ground of breach of confidence? The general
answer is no, unless A and B have a contract obligating B to respect
A's confidences. Such contracts are rarely made, presumably because the costs of a broken confidence are normally low relative to
the costs of negotiating and enforcing a contract. Also, effective
nonlegal sanctions for breach of promise by a social friend or
family member are created by the continuing nature of the relationship. 45 An occasional exception is where the confidence is imparted in the course of business dealings, especially where it is a
valuable trade secret; here one often finds explicit contracts forbidding breach of confidence.
If the fact imparted in confidence is discreditable, a contract
designed to prevent its disclosure might well be viewed as contrary
to public policy and hence unenforceable. This result would be in
harmony with the analysis in this paper and is the general approach
of the law. If I confess a crime and exact your promise not to reveal
my confession to anyone, the promise is unenforceable no matter
what formalities of contractual obligation are employed. Yet there
is an important set of exceptions to this principle: at common law,
information imparted in confidence in conversations between
spouses, between client and lawyer, and between certain government officials ("executive privilege") is given extraordinary protection.46 For example, a husband who has confessed a crime to his
44. An intermediate case is the impact of pretrial discovery on corporate recordretention policies. Fewer and less candid records are kept, but a large organization cannot
function without some document retention.
45. See Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 417

(1977).
46. See C. McCORMiCx, supra note 35, chs. 9, 10, 12. The doctor-patient privilege is

statutory.
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wife can prevent her from testifying to the confession in a criminal
proceeding. This result is puzzling from an economic standpoint.
True, the marital and lawyer-client relationships would be impaired if the spouse and the client respectively had to exercise extreme circumspection in communication, because the nature of
these relationships makes it easy for the spouse or lawyer to detect
guilt from an unguarded remark. But why should society wish to
strengthen the bonds of matrimony and of legal representation for
criminals17
A possible answer in the case of the spousal immunity is that
if there is a sufficiently strong social interest in promoting the marriage relationship, the immunity, although it raises the costs of
crime, may be justifiable in terms of the encouragement it offers
to spouses to communicate with each other without concern for
possible later use of testimony against them. 48 It is not surprising,

therefore, in an era when the importance attached to stable mardeclined, to find a strong movement against the imriages has
49
munity.

The opposite extreme from the spousal and lawyer-client
privileges would be a rule requiring people to disclose material
facts about themselves-t6 issue periodic disclosures similar to those
that corporations are required to make under the federal securities
laws. Theory and experience suggest that in neither area is such a
reporting requirement necessary or appropriate. 50 We can leave to
contract, formal or informal, the task of eliciting the amount of
disclosure that creditors, employers, spouses, friends-or shareholders-deem optimal in deciding whether and on what terms
to deal with the individual or corporation in question. A uniform
approach to the regulation of personal and commercial or corporate
information is indicated. My previous article (in its discussion of
the privacy tort) and the present one (in its discussion of the defamation tort in Part V) provide evidence that the common law, at
47. A traditional reply in the case of the lawyer-client privilege is that the lawyer's
ability to represent his client would be impaired if he were able to appear in the case as a
witness. The reply is unavailable in the case of the spousal immunity.
48. This is the traditional rationale of the immunity (see C. IMICCORMICK, supra note
35, at § 86), and, as Gary Becker has pointed out to me, is fully consistent with the recent
economic analyses of the family.
49. See C. McCoRMIcK, LAw OF EVIDENCE 30 (2d ed. Supp. 1978).
50. On the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws, see G. BENSTON,
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DrsCLOsuRE IN THE UK AND Tm USA (1976), and Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
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least, has applied a unitary standard to the personal and commercial-corporate spheres.
F.

Physical Privacy

The most elementary concept of privacy is that of physical
privacy, as when one speaks of a "private apartment," or of lacking
"privacy" when one has to share a kitchen with another family or
an office with a co-worker. Physical privacy is important not in itself
but as the precondition for the various sorts of privacy I have been
discussing-seclusion, innovation, concealment, and conversational
privacy. It can be used to relate a society's level of privacy to its
material conditions. Poor people or poor societies may not be able
to afford the amount of physical space necessary to create privacy.51
In the poorest of societies physical privacy is obtainable only by
retreating to the wilds, often at considerable danger. Apart from
purely spatial considerations, poor societies lack the occupational
and recreational mobility that fosters privacy by making it costly
to keep track of people. Urbanization powerfully facilitates privacy
by enabling individuals to obtain anonymity.
The historical growth in privacy involves a shift both in demand and in supply. Assuming people seek private homes or move
to cities as their incomes rise, in order to obtain greater privacy
(a plausible motivation in light of the many private benefits, in
innovation, concealment, etc., that privacy affords), privacy is a
superior good (i.e., proportionately more is demanded as income
rises) that has increased tremendously over time as a result of the
secular growth in incomes.52 However, developments that have
facilitated privacy, like the city, the private home, and the automobile, have been motivated by other desires as well. In incidentally lowering the costs of obtaining privacy, these developments
have further promoted its growth and provide an additional reason
for observing an increase of privacy as society becomes wealthier
and more urban.
51. On the conditions of privacy in poor societies, see text accompanying notes 56-57
infra. An alternative possibility explored in my unpublished paper, A Theory of Primitive
Society, with Special Reference to Law (Feb. 1979), is that primitive societies deny privacy
to their members in order to reduce the incidence of unlawful behavior, which might
otherwise be great because of the absence of police, autopsies, and other institutions and
devices of detection and enforcement. See also note 25 supra.
52. The growth of the proportion of workers engaged in primarily mental rather
than physical labor may also be a factor, though one operative principally with regard to
privacy at work rather than in the house.
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Another factor operating on the supply side is the cost of surveillance, until recently a highly labor-intensive activity that had
presumably been growing relatively more costly as an aspect of the
general lag of productivity growth in the labor-intensive service
sector compared to the capital-intensive manufacturing sector. This
trend has probably been reversed by developments in electronics
over the past fifty years, beginning with wiretapping. Recent advances in computerized data processing have enabled the accumulation at low cost of vast amounts of private information by credit
bureaus, insurance companies, other private firms, and government.
At the same time the government's demand for personal information has grown as an incident to the expansion of the size, and concomitant taxing requirements, of government.
If privacy is indeed a superior good, but one whose cost is now
rising because of a decline in the relative cost of prying, we may
have a clue to the recent legislative movement to give people more
privacy. I return to this subject in Part VI.
G. Curiosity and Prying
Just as there is a demand for privacy, so there is a demand for
pestering, for prying, and for invading privacy in other ways. The
tendency in thought is to couple an uncritical enthusiasm for privacy with an uncritical revulsion against prying. Yet the prying
that used to be the domain of the village gossip but is now more
likely to be done by investigative reporters and gossip columnists
may serve an important social function in unmasking the misrepresentations that people employ to deceive others into transacting
with them on advantageous terms. (I use transaction in the broadest
sense, to include the individual who wants to be "our" Vice-President without disclosing his history of mental illness.)
A separate function of prying, unrelated to self-protection
against deceptive transactors, is educational. People learn about life
and form their tastes in great part by imitation of other people.
But in a society where physical privacy is highly developed and
highly prized, it is difficult to observe the conduct of other people
directly. In these circumstances there is a demand for gossip columns. The demand is further stimulated by the high opportunity
costs of time. These costs, along with higher literacy, make reading
a more efficient method of informing oneself about possible "role
models" than trying to observe them in person.
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The idea that gossip columns have an informational content
is one of the most strongly resisted implications of the economic
analysis of privacy. But how else is one to explain why the "prurient" interest in the private lives of the wealthy and celebrated is
positively correlated with the possession, not absence, of physical
privacy? Gossip columns and movie magazines flourish more in the
United States than in Europe where there is (as we shall discuss in
the next part of the paper) less physical privacy than in the United
States. And although the gossip column, movie magazine, and other
vehicles of public gossip are considered the domain of the vulgar
and uneducated, they seem to be growing steadily in this country
despite the rising level of education-because, I suggest, the growth
of physical privacy has shut off direct observation of how strangers
live.53
No doubt some prying cannot be explained in purely market
terms. But most of that is probably done by the government rather
than by private employers, creditors, neighbors, and newspaper reporters. Two considerations support this conclusion. First, the government is often engaged in activities for which there are no economic justifications-such as using taxation to transfer wealth from
its opponents to its supporters-and in which prying is an important
tool. Second, the lack of competitive constraints makes the cost to
government of carrying prying beyond the point where marginal
benefit and marginal cost are equated less than it would be to private firms and individuals. I return to these points in Part VII.
IV.

SOME EVIDENCE FOR THE ECONOMIC APPROACH

The preceding part of this paper repeated and extended the
economic analysis used in my previous paper as the basis for arguing that the common law rules relating to privacy are efficient. I
will not repeat or attempt to add to that evidence here, 4 but will
53.

Compare Westin's description of how the houses of the wealthy in ancient Rome
IN WsrERN SO.
ciETY: FROM THE AGE oF PERICLES TO THE AMERIcAN REPUBLIC 44 (Report to Ass'n of Bar
of City of N.Y. Spec. Comm. on Sci. & Law, Feb. 15, 1965). This pattern persists to this
day in many European cities but is rare in the United States. On transaction-cost obstacles
to purchasing the private information recounted in gossip columns from the subjects, see
Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 417-18.
54. See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 409-21. With regard to defamation, see
part V infra. Bloustein, supra note 24, at 442-47, points out that some of the privacy cases
protect a kind of shyness (e.g., about nudity) that is not always motivated by a desire to
conceal discreditable facts about oneself. That the cases protect such shyness is not incon.
sistent with the economic theory of the privacy tort (a point Bloustein fails to understand);

were cheek-by-jowl with the tenements of the poor. A. WESTN, PRIVACY
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instead take up a different point. If one accepts (at least for argument's sake) that the privacy cases are broadly consistent with the
economic theory of privacy, what evidence is there that the theory
itself is correct?
Much of the evidence is indirect. Empirical studies of a wide
variety of personal behavior not usually considered economically
motivated, including the choice of a spouse and the decision
whether to commit a "noneconomic" crime such as malicious mischief or rape, confirm the applicability of the economic model to
such behavior.55 These studies establish a mild presumption that
the economic approach is applicable to other sorts of personal behavior as well, such as that involved in privacy situations.
There is also some direct evidence for the economic model of,
privacy, contained in comparative and in psychological studies.
1. Although there is no convenient metric for ranking societies by the amount of privacy they afford, some gross distinctions
are possible, and suggestive. In most primitive societies (American
Indian, tribal African, and so on), privacy is virtually nonexistent.56
People live crowded together in small villages, lack private rooms
and often even doors to the outside, are rarely alone, and have little

it is the shyness itself that presents a puzzle from the economic standpoint. See note 38
and accompanying text supra. Bloustein's larger point, which I accept, is that the term
"privacy" embraces more than just concealment of information; but my first article made
clear that concealment is just one aspect of privacy. See Right of Privacy, supra note I,
at 393. Bloustein also criticizes my discussion of the appropriation cases. See Bloustein,
supra note 24, at 447-49. His criticism is difficult to understand because he concludes by
making a point that is at once an economic point and the heart of my analysis of the
appropriation cases: "once one establishes a personal right to a name and likeness ... a
commercial market in the name and likeness can grow and flourish. A name and likeness
can only command a commercial price in a society that permits a person to control the
conditions under which he may use his name and likeness for commercial purposes." Id. at
449. Bloustein makes the further criticism that I should have offered empirical evidence
to support the proposition that "poor people 'figure as central characters in novels' less
frequently than wealthy ones." Id. at 451 (quoting Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 396).
Since Bloustein never offers empirical evidence for any proposition that he advances, his
demand has a somewhat hollow ring. But, in any event, no one who reads novels would
doubt that the rich are overrepresented in them on the basis of their fraction of the
population.
55. For illustrative studies, see Becker, Landes & Michael, An Economic Analysis of
Marital Instability,85 J. POL. ECON. 1141 (1977); Landes, An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976, 21 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1978); and studies cited in G. BECKER,

supra note 4, at 9-11.
56.

See, e.g., Right of Privacy, sup.ra note 1, at 896 n.10; J. HAVILAND, GossiP, REPUTA(1977); Roberts & Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View,

TION, AND KNOWLEDGE IN ZINACANTAN

in Nomos xin: PRIvAcY, supra note 20, at 199. For a vivid evocation of the lack of privacy
in primitive societies, see E. EvANs-ParrmcaA, THE NuER 15 (1940).
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opportunity for concealment of any sort.5 7 The absence of privacy
(suggested by the lack of even a word for it in the languages of
primitive peoples) implies, if the economic analysis in Part II is
correct, that speech in primitive and ancient societies will tend to
be more formal and circumspect than in modern societies, in just
the same way-another bit of evidence of the economic model-that
modem people speak more formally the larger the audience. 8 The
Homeric epics, which assumed their final form in the late eighth or
early seventh century B.C., provide the most striking but not the
only evidence of the precision and decorum of primitive speechso at variance with the crudeness of primitive technology.50 Rhetoric was an important field of education and study in Aristotle's time
(and indeed long before), but has virtually disappeared today.
There seems to be a secular trend, coincident with and arguably
related to the growth of privacy, toward informality in speech and
writing and away from insistence on lexical and grammatical precision and on rhetorical craft.
Another implication of the economic analysis of privacy is that
mendacity will be less reprobated in a primitive than in an advanced society. Where people, lacking privacy, know each other
very well, telling lies is less likely to serve a manipulative purpose
(and more likely to serve a dramatic, diplomatic, or metaphorical
function) than in a modern, highly differentiated society where
relatively little is known about the people with whom one transacts
and much, therefore, must be taken on trust. The difference in the
view of mendacity taken by primitive and by modern societies was
explained long ago by a distinguished sociologist in terms similar
to the above. 0
The absence of privacy in primitive societies has yet another
57. For example, the Yanoama Indians live in large collective dwellings of up to
100 yards in diameter. As many as 250 people will live in each dwelling, grouped in
families each of which clusters around its own hearth. There are no walls within the
dwellings. The Yanoama villages are surrounded by thousands of miles of virgin forest
but it is considered dangerous to leave the village. See N. CHAGNON, YANOAM6: THEn FIERCE
PEOPLE (2d ed. 1977); W. SMOLE, YANOAMA INDIANS: A CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY (1976).
58. And the discussion in faculty meetings is more formal if student observers are
admitted.
59. See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 402 n.20; see also C. GEERTez, PERSON, TIME
AND CONDUCT IN BALI: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL ANALYSIS (1966); F. KEESING & M. KESING,
ELITE COMMUNICATION IN SAMOA: A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP (1956); LANGUAGE IN CULTURE
AND SOCIETY pt. II (D. Hymes ed. 1964); POIATICAL LANGUAGE AND ORATORY IN TRADITIONAL
SOCIETY

60.

(M. Bloch ed. 1975).
See Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 AM. J. Soc. 441,

446, 450 (1906).
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implication: that primitive societies will be stagnant, noninnovative, and unprogressive. These are indeed well-attested features of
primitive society, but the connection with lack of privacy has been
overlooked. In the absence of a developed system of property rights
in ideas, privacy is essential, according to the analysis in Part III,
if people are to appropriate the benefits of their creative ideas.
Without such appropriability there is little incentive to develop
such ideas. I am suggesting, in short, that people don't merely lack
doors and partitions because they are primitive, but are primitive
in part because they lack doors and partitions.
The amount of privacy necessary to sustain innovative activity
of a high order may, however, be less than we now take for granted.
For example, only the very wealthy in ancient Rome enjoyed the
physical privacy that most people in the advanced countries enjoy
today; and their privacy was greatly compromised because they
were under continual observation by their servants, many of whom,
apparently, were disloyal (servants were often paid police informers).61 In the medieval manor the whole household would often
sleep together in the great hall (with the lord and lady, perhaps
joined by one or two favored guests, in the only bed). As late as
the 17th century it was common for the well-to-do to have servants
sleep in their bedrooms for protection against possible intruders.
As late as the 18th century bedrooms opened into each other rather
than into a common hallway.
It is my conjecture that at some point, reached long ago, further increases in the amount of personal privacy no longer increased significantly the incentive to innovate but did, of course,
continue to increase the ability of people to conceal their activities
for manipulative purposes. The identification of this point of
diminishing social returns to privacy is, obviously, a research task
of formidable difficulty; it will not be attempted here. I will simply
note, both as further evidence of an association between privacy
and innovation and as a possible clue to when the point of diminishing social returns was reached, Lawrence Stone's finding that mod61. My main source for the history recounted in the paragraph is the interesting
study in A. WarsIN, supra note 53. For an excellent brief discussion, see L. STONE, THE
FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 253-56 (1977). See also N. ELIS, supra
note 41, at 163; Goldthwaite, The FlorentinePalace as Domestic Architecture, 77 Am. HIsT.
Rxv. 977 (1972). Stone places special emphasis on desire to escape prying servants (who
were frequent witnesses in criminal proceedings for adultery against their masters) as

motivating the demand for privacy. L.

STONE,

supra, at 254. This is evidence for the in-

strumental theory of privacy advanced in this and my previous article.
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ern ideas of privacy date from the early rise of capitalism. 2 Stone
suggests an ideological affinity between privacy and entrepreneurship; I am suggesting an economic relationship.
Another interesting comparison is between modern-day America and Europe.8 3 There is more physical privacy in America than
in Europe. Europeans live in more crowded conditions; singlefamily houses are rarer; "suburban sprawl" remains largely an
American phenomenon;6 many Europeans still live in villages;
and there is greater occupational and geographical mobility in the
United States than in Europe. These characteristics bearing on
physical privacy are reinforced by the greater intrusiveness of the
state in Europe than in America-the internal passports, and so on.
The lack of privacy implies, on an economic view, and one finds
that Europeans are (1) more formal and precise in their use of language and (2) more reserved and circumspect with strangers-more
"private." (The behavior of Japanese, who also lack privacy by
American standards, supports this point.) The American gabbles
freely to strangers; the European and Japanese do not. The reason
suggested by the analysis in this paper is that the American is so
favorably situated for concealing discreditable information about
himself that he incurs little cost in revealing himself to a stranger.
The chance that this stranger will encounter him again, or knows
people who know him, or is otherwise a candidate for significant
future interactions with him is less in the American than in the
European or Japanese setting.
This analysis implies that within the United States we should
encounter a high level of rhetorical skills among people living in
crowded conditions, such as "ghetto" blacks. Given the educational
deficiencies characteristic of this group, it would be surprising to find
them well equipped with expressive skills. Yet in fact the research of
sociolinguists has established that "Nonstandard Negro English,"
or "Black English Vernacular," while displaying important differences in grammar and vocabulary from standard English, are ex62. See L. STONE, supra note 61, at 259-60.
63. See Spiro, Privacy in Comparative Perspective, in NoMos xni: PRIvAcy, supra note
20, at 121, and for the factual basis of this paragraph, E. HALL, Tim HIDDEN DIMENSION
123-53 (1966).
64. The individual who lives in one community, works in another, and commutes between them in a private automobile has much more privacy than the individual who lives
and works in the same community and walks or takes public transportation between home
and office: the opportunities for surveillance of the latter individual by his neighbors-

co-workers are so much greater.
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pressive instruments of considerable subtlety and power.65 Lack of
privacy may explain the emphasis placed in this otherwise deprived
culture on rhetorical skill.
2. Like the comparative studies, the psychological studies reveal greater circumspection where the costs of candor are higher.
Experimental study has shown, for example, that a man approached
by a stranger will tend to speak less freely to him than a woman
approached by a stranger. 6 This difference need not be ascribed to
a biological difference between the sexes. An economic explanation
is possible. Because men are more likely to be involved in market
activities than women, they generally derive greater value from
concealment of possibly discreditable information than women do,
and this fact may be responsible for the greater reticence that traditionally distinguishes men from nonworking women. The same
study showed that a man will generally speak about himself with
greater candor to a female than to a male stranger. This behavior
is consistent with the fact that a man (excepting the occasional Don
Juan) is more likely to be a candidate for future transactions with
another man (who might be a tax collector, a detective, the employee of a competitor, and so on) than with a woman.
Still another relevant finding in this study is that out-oftowners at the Boston airport, when approached by a stranger,
were more likely to confide personal information to the stranger
than residents of Boston were. The experimenter offered an explanation that is consistent with the economic approach: "Whereas
the Bostonian subject might conceivably expect to run into the
experimenter again some day on Beacon Hill or in Copley Square,
the out-of-towner could be virtually certain that their paths would
never again cross. 67 In the same spirit George Stigler has speculated that the candor (startling to a modern reader) with which the
characters in 19th century English novels reveal their incomes reflects the absence of income tax.
65. See, e.g., 'W. LABOV, LANGUAGE IN THE INNER CITY: STUDIES IN THE BLACK ENGLISH
VENACULAR (1972). For a brief discussion, see S.ERVIN-TRIPP, LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND
COMMUNICATIVE CHOICE 351 (1973), and P. TRUDGILL, SOCIOLINGUIsrICS: AN INTRODUM'TON
65-83 (1974). Labov states elsewhere: "Our work in the Spanish community makes it
painfully obvious that in many ways working-class speakers are more effective narrators,
reasoners, and debaters than many middle-class speakers who temporize, qualify, and lose
their argument in a mass of irrelevant detail." Labov, A Linguistic Viewpoint Toward
Black English, in LANGUAGE, SOCIETY, AND EDUCATION: A PROFILE OF BLACK ENGLISH 10,
21 (J.DeStefano ed. 1973).
66. See Rubin, Disclosing Oneself to a Stranger: Reciprocity and Its Limits, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 233 (1975), and studies cited therein.
67. Id. at 255-56.
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The psychological studies relating to privacy also tend to refute the notion, which is inconsistent with the economic model,
that privacy is a psychological necessity. Studies of crowding, a
proxy for lack of privacy, indicate that the pure effect of crowding
on various measures of mental health or stability is insignificant. 8
Privacy is not something we "need," as we need food or air; it is
something we want in order to advance plans far removed from
biological imperatives. Rational behavior respecting privacy is also
suggested by the way in which people will substitute reticence for
physical privacy when the latter is in short supply, 9 a substitution
clearly related to the tendency to use more formal modes of expression with larger audiences (less privacy).
The evidence discussed above, and a little more that could be
added,7 obviously does not establish the economic theory of privacy
on empirically firm foundations. Each piece of evidence is susceptible of alternative explanations. What may be said at this early
stage in the economic study of privacy is that the economic model
has a certain power to organize and explain a diverse array of fairly
well-attested, if not systematically measured, phenomena.
V.

AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF DEFAMATION

My previous article on privacy focused on the privacy tort. Although the tort of defamation (libel and slander) has long been
recognized to raise parallel questions, economics is useful in clarifying the precise relationship between the two torts. It also provides
a perspective from which to evaluate the frequent charge that
defamation is doctrinally the least satisfactory branch of tort law
because riddled with arcane and irrational distinctions, such as
that between libel per se and libel per quod. 1 As we shall see,
68. See, e.g., Freedman, Heshka & Levy, PopulationDensity and Pathology: Is There

a Relationship?,11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 539 (1975).
69. See, e.g., Greenberg & Firestone, Compensatory Responses to Crowding: Effects of
Personal Space Intrusion and Privacy Reduction, 35 J. PERSoNALiTY & Soc. PsYc. 637
(1977), and Arab behavior discussed in E. HALL,supra note 63, at 148.

70. See discussion of Buckley Amendment in Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 40102, Goffman's work on misrepresentation in everyday life in id. at 395, and the studies of

the growth of single-person households, supra note 7.
71. Prosser states: "It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal
of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for
which no legal writer ever has had a kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict
liability imposed upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in

the law, with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and
very serious harm." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted). Chapter 19 of the Prosser book contains a lucid summary of the rules of
defamation law on which I have drawn heavily in the following discussion.
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economic theory is quite useful in explaining the general structure, although not all of the details, of defamation law.
Reputation has an important economic function in a market
system (or in any system where voluntary interactions are important). It reduces the search costs of buyers and sellers, makes it
easier for the superior producer to increase his sales relative to
those of inferior ones, and in these ways helps channel resources
into their most valuable employments-a process at the heart of the
market system. This role is not limited to explicit markets; it is
just as vital to the functioning of the "marriage market," the market in friends, the political market, and so on.
The falsification of reputation is therefore a matter of legitimate social concern. Such falsification can take either of two forms.
A firm or an individual-it does not matter which-may try to
create an undeservedly good reputation either by affirmative misrepresentation or by the concealment of discreditable facts about
itself or himself. It is this process that gives rise to the kind of
pseudo-privacy claim discussed in this and my previous article. Orand here is where the tort of defamation comes in-the falsification
of reputation can take the form of besmirching some person's (or
some firm's) deservedly good reputation.
One can identify in a broad way the factors that make it more
or less likely that attempts at defamation"a will be made. First, if
everything is known about an individual, so that his reputation is
not an extrapolation from limited knowledge but the sum of all
the facts about him, defamation will not succeed-it will not be
believed. (Stated otherwise, if the costs of information are very
low, any falsity in an aspersion about a person or product will be
detected.) In these circumstances defamation will not pay. This
implies that defamation is a problem chiefly of relatively modern
as distinct from tribal or village societies; and the relative infrequency of references to defamation in accounts of primitive society
provides some support for this observation.Y An additional factor,
however, is the inverse relationship between the importance of
reputation as a factor inducing or deterring transactions and the
72. I use the term generally to mean a false aspersion, though the legal approach is
to regard the aspersion as the defamation and truth as a defense to liability.
73. Defamation was a recognized wrong among the Nuer people of the Sudan, but,
significantly, it is said to be "usually associated with false accusation of witchcraft" (P.
HoWELL, A MANUAL OF NUER LAWsv
70 (1954))-a type of accusation whose falsity is difficult
to detect among people (even if they lack privacy) who believe in witchcraft. To similar

effect, see W.

GOLDSCHMIT, SEBEI LAW

131-33 (1967).
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existence of well-developed remedies for breach of contract. In the
absence of such remedies the parties' interest in preserving their
reputations for honoring contracts is the only solid assurance that
neither will terminate opportunistically. That is why "honor
among thieves" is not a contradiction in terms and, perhaps, why
honor is a central value in primitive cultures. The less developed
the social institutions of contract are, the greater are the potential
losses from having one's reputation impaired.
A related but more complex consideration is the difficulty of
"living down" one's reputation in a close-knit tribal or village society. In a mobile urban society such as ours an injury to reputation can often be cured simply by changing one's job or place of
residence. However, since a great deal of specific human capital
may be lost in such a move, the cure may be a costly one. The
greater range of defamatory utterances made possible by modern
technology must also be considered: television can besmirch an
individual's reputation throughout the world.
Weighing the above factors, one might conclude that the problem of defamation is apt to be most serious in a society that has
recently emerged from the tribal-village state in which reputations
cannot be credibly falsified but that has not yet developed effective
institutions of contract that would reduce the importance of
reputation as a factor inducing people to transact with one. Consistently with this suggestion, we find the defamation tort broadly
defined in late, but not early, republican Rome. Conditions in
the early Republic were presumably close to those of tribal society, while the late Republic may be described as a society recently
emergent from the tribal state. Similarly, in medieval England,
again a society recently emergent from the tribal state, defamation
actions apparently flourished, especially in the ecclesiastical courts.
Later, though the tort was more broadly defined in some respects,
its practical utility was reduced by the creation of various defenses
and, in particular, by rules strictly construing defamatory utterances against the victim. 75
Since defaming an individual and disparaging a competing
74. See

H. JOLOWiCZ & B. NIcHoLAs,

ISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 01

ROMAN LAW 191, 273 (3d ed. 1972).
75. On the history of defamation in England, see C. FiFooT, HISTORY AND SouRCES OF
THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONmRACT 126-53 (1949); Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation I, 3 CoLuas. L. R-v. 546-57 (1903); Helmholz, Canonical
Defamation in Medieval England, 15 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 255 (1971); Donnelly, History of
Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 100-01.
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producer or his goods are the same thing-fraud-the question
arises why the tort of defamation developed earlier and further
than that of disparagement.7 6 An answer is suggested by the economic literature on fraud.7 7 That literature distinguishes among
"search" or "inspection" goods, whose quality and fitness are ascertainable on inspection before sale; "experience" goods, whose
qualities are revealed only in use (e.g., the durability of a camera);
and "credence" goods, whose qualities are so difficult to discover
that the buyer is heavily dependent on the good faith of the seller.
The buyer's need for legal protection rises as we move along the
spectrum from search to credence goods. In the formative era of
the common law of disparagement (say, up to the enactment of the
Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914) most goods were still
search goods and the need for legal protection against disparagement by a competitor was therefore small. But long before then an
individual had become a "credence" good, to be taken on faith
rather than inspection, and his need for legal protection of reputation was greater than that of the producer of a disparaged good.
If A called B a crook, B's social and business acquaintances probably would not7 know B so intimately as to be confident that A's
claim was false. 8
To equate defamation with commercial disparagement may
seem to give defamation too commercial an air and to ignore the
"dignitary" interests that the tort also protects. However, the tort
is not in fact designed for the protection of peace of mind, selfesteem, or other "private" interests or sensitivities. This is shown
by the requirement of "publication." The aspersion must be communicated to someone besides the victim in order to be actionable.
That is, it must lower other peoples' opinion of the victim's character and so impair his opportunities for advantageous (social or
business) transactions.7 9 A wounding lie that does not impair those
76. On the common law's restrictive approach to disparagement, see American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
77.

See, e.g., Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud,

16 J. LAw & ECON. 67 (1973); Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL.
EcoN. 311 (1970).

78. A similar point is made in Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law
of False Advertising (forthcoming in J. LEGAL STUD.). It is consistent with this distinction
that corporations can complain of defamation to the same extent (mutatis mutandis) as
individuals, for the corporation itself is bound to be a "credence" good even if its products
are "search" goods. If a competitor says a corporation doesn't pay its bills, prospective
creditors of the corporation have no ready means to falsify the assertion.
79. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) op ToRTs § 559 (1976).
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opportunities is not actionable. This result is consistent with the
fact that the privacy tort does not afford a remedy for an individual's feelings that have been wounded by disclosure of truthful
facts material to other people in deciding whether or on what
terms to transact with him.
The defamation and privacy torts interact in two other notable
ways. First, if A in private conversation with B slanders C, and an
eavesdropper overhears the conversation, the slander is not actionable. 0 This is the logical corollary of the social judgment, which I
have argued has an economic basis, that the privacy of conversations should be protected in order to foster effective communication. Second, privacy and defamation differ in that a disclosure of
private information, to be actionable as an invasion of privacy,
must be "publicized" 81-disseminated widely--whereas defamation
is actionable so long as one person reads or hears it. This has
seemed to some an arbitrary distinction, but it makes sense once
the economic relationship between the two torts is grasped. Normally the disclosure that gives rise to a privacy claim is truthful
(if it were false, it would be actionable as defamation). When such
a disclosure is made in a small circle, which will normally be the
circle of people acquainted with the individual whose privacy has
been breached, there is a social benefit: the individual is unmasked
and his acquaintances are enabled to reevaluate their relationships
with him in the light of a more complete knowledge of his character. 2 If, however, the disclosure is widely publicized, it is likely to
reach beyond the circle of his acquaintances, to people with whom
he has neither present dealings nor any substantial likelihood of
dealing in the future. Disclosures to them are less likely to
perform an unmasking function, and more likely to invade the
interest in seclusion (as distinct from manipulation), than more
selective disclosure. The publicity requirement thus serves to
identify the subset of disclosures that most likely entail invasions of legitimate interests. To be sure, the harm to the individual from publicizing private information about him to
strangers is normally less than that of publicizing such facts to
people with whom he has advantageous relationships. The latter
harm, however, is simply the obverse of the benefit to these people
from having such knowledge, so there is unlikely to be a net social
80. See W. PROSSER, supra note 71, at 774.
81. See id. at 810.
82. Thus, it is not an actionable invasion of privacy for a creditor to write a debtor's
employer informing him that his employee has failed to pay the debt when due. See, e.g.,
Cullum v. Government Employees Fin. Corp., 517 $.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974).
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benefit from protecting the individual's privacy in such a case.
But when private information about an individual is publicized
to strangers, they derive little benefit from it, less perhaps than
the harm to him from the invasion of his interest in seclusion.
Stated otherwise, publicity appears to be a necessary, though not a
sufficient, condition for a privacy action to confer net social benefits.
The situation in the case of defamation tends to be reversed.
Defamation is likely to inflict its worst social harm precisely in the
circle of the individual's friends or acquaintances. It is they whom
the lie is most likely to deflect from advantageous social transactions,
to their own injury as well as the defamed individual's, because it is
they with whom he transacts. To be sure, they are also better placed
to detect the falsity of the defamation than strangers are; but there
can be no doubt that a requirement of publicity would place many
costly defamations beyond the reach of the law.
Let us consider the economic rationality of some of the other
distinctive features of the defamation tort. First of all, it is a strict
liability tort; the fact that the defendant may have exercised reasonable care to prevent the defamation is immaterial to liability. In
one well-known case, the author of a fictitious newspaper story by
sheer fortuity gave a character in the story the name of a real
person, Artemus Jones. Jones sued for libel and won upon a showing that his neighbors thought the story was about him. 3 The
choice between strict liability and alternative bases of liability
(such as no liability or negligence liability) turns mainly, in economic analysis, on the relative abilities of the injurer and victim
to avoid harm. Jones could have done nothing to avoid being defamed, whereas the author or publisher might have checked to
see whether there was a real-life counterpart to the fictitious villain,
or at least might have included the now-standard disclaimer to the
effect that any resemblance to any person living or dead is purely
coincidental.8 4 In general, victims of defamation cannot reasonably
avoid being falsely defamed, so that casting liability on them would
have no beneficial allocative consequences; in contrast, most false
defamation can be avoided by reasonable inquiry on the part of
83. Jones v. E. Hutton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20.

84. In Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1925), where the report
of a criminal charge against one man was taken to refer to another man having the same
first and last names, the court pointed out that the newspaper could easily (cheaply) have
avoided the confusion by using the middle initials of the man it was writing about.
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the defamer. In these circumstances a rule of strict liability is attractive from an economic standpoint."5
Consistently with this distinction, the mere disseminator of
a slander or libel-a newspaper distributor, for example-is liable
for defamation only if he is negligent in failing to recognize the
defamatory or untruthful character of the utterance. Since the costs
to the mere disseminator of preventing defamation are often prohibitive, a rule of strict liability would be economically unjustifiable, in that it would shift losses often with no justification based
on the superior ability of the "defamer" to avoid the defamation.
Another notable exception to strict liability is the no-liability
rule applicable to group defamations-"all lawyers are shysters,"
for example. Several economic considerations support this rule.
First, the injury to the individual member of the group tends to
be trivial. The difference in this respect between group and individual defamation is the difference between the demand facing
an individual firm and the demand facing the industry of which
it is a part. The substitutability of the products of other firms in
an industry is likely to be so great as to make the individual firm's
demand almost perfectly elastic, but the industry demand may be
highly inelastic because products of other industries are not close
substitutes. If people believe the libel "X is a shyster lawyer," they
can and will substitute other lawyers and X's business will drop
sharply. But if they believe that all lawyers are shysters, there isn't
much they can do about it-there are no close substitutes for lawyers. The loss of business to the profession, and hence to the individual lawyers if they are assumed to share proportionately equally
in the profession's loss of business caused by the defamation, will
be small.
A related point is that most group libels, if attributed to all
members of the group, are inherently incredible and hence do
little harm; and if they are attributed only to some or even to most
members, they do little harm to any individual. Few people would
believe that all lawyers are shysters. But if for the sake of credibility
the libel is restated in the form "most lawyers are shysters," then
the harm to the individual lawyer must be discounted by the
probability that a client or prospective client will view him as included in the shyster majority rather than the nonshyster minority.
85. On the economics of the choice between strict liability and negligence, see R.
POSNR, supra note 5, at 137-42, 441-42.
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Finally, when group attributes or tendencies are in issue, the
costs of determining the truth or falsity of an utterance are greater
than when only a single individual's characteristics are at issue.
Another feature of the defamation tort-that there can be no
actionable defamation of a dead person-may also seem based on
the costs of determining whether the aspersion is true or false.
There is, however, another possible explanation for this rule. The
economic function of reputation is to foster transactions. Once the
transactor is dead any subsequent injury to his reputation can have
no market impact. Stated otherwise, personal reputation is a form
of nontransferable human capital and hence is extinguished by
death. But this point is overstated: being told that your father was
a thief or a bankrupt may, if I believe in the heritability of criminal
tendencies, affect my willingness to transact with you. The law
provides a remedy for the most serious of these cases by allowing
a descendant to maintain a defamation action where the deceased
ancestor is alleged to have possessed some clearly inheritable defect
or disorder."6
The best known, and a much criticized, distinction in the law
of defamation is that between the standards for proving slander
(oral defamation) and those for proving libel (written). Slander is
actionable without proof of special damages (that is, without proof
of actual pecuniary loss) only if the slanderer alleges conduct falling into one of the four per se categories: criminal acts, loathsome
disease, female unchastity, and unfitness for one's profession or
vocation. Outside of these categories, to be actionable a slander
must be shown to have caused an actual monetary loss to the victim.
Libel is not so confined. The victim need prove special damages
only if the identity of the individual libeled is not evident on the
face of the libel; if extrinsic facts are necessary for the identification, then special damages must be proved unless the libel alleges
conduct falling within one of the four categories defining slander
Perse.
The idea of a per se category is surely not in itself to be
criticized. It is a familiar legal technique (widely used, for example,in antitrust law) that can readily be justified by reference to the
trade-off between the costs of error and the costs of reducing the
probability of error by a more detailed examination of the facts
in a particular case. The principal criticism of the per se categories
86. See Developments in the Law-Defamation,69 HAIv. L. R~v. 875, 893--94 (1956).
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in slander is that they have not kept pace with changing times.
They made pretty good sense when first established.87 To be
thought unchaste (if a woman, in traditional societies) would
drastically reduce a woman's opportunities for marriage, a transaction of immense importance for women in such societies. To be
thought to have leprosy, syphilis, or plague-the diseases classified as loathsome for purposes of the tort-would greatly reduce
one's opportunities for interactions of all sorts; and so if one were
thought a criminal. Finally, to be thought unfit for one's job would
have a direct effect upon one's ability to participate in advantageous
market activities. Other slanders might, of course, also do serious
harm to a person's ability to have advantageous dealings with
others-and were actionable, but only upon proof of actual eco-.
nomic loss.
Superficially, the distinction basic to libel law between a libel
that identifies the victim on its face and one where extrinsic facts
are necessary to make the identification makes economic sense.
Having to know additional facts in order to link up the libel with
the intended victim reduces the potential circle of those who will
act on the libel to the victim's (and their own) disadvantage. However, the people who know the relevant extrinsic facts are precisely
those most likely to be acquainted with the victim, while those
ignorant of these facts are likely to be people who have no acquaintance or potential acquaintance with the victim and hence
are unlikely to act on the libel anyway. The extrinsic-fact rule can
thus be criticized as smuggling a publicity requirement into defamation, where for reasons stated earlier it does not belong, by the
back door.
These details to one side, the stricter treatment of written
than of oral defamation makes sense. Anomalous cases can be imagined-the private letter versus the public address to a large
audience-but, in general and putting aside the recent (in the
evolution of the common law) cases of radio and television, written
defamations tend to reach larger audiences than spoken and hence
to import greater harm to the victim. To be sure, the larger audience may often be composed of strangers, so that the incremental
harm is small. But by the same token, strangers will generally be
less capable of detecting the falsity in the defamation than acquaintances, so the added harm may not be small, after all. There
87. On the historical origin of the categories, see Veeder, supra note 75, at 560 n.1.
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are, moreover, other reasons that support the law's stricter treatment of libel than of slander. First, as we saw in Part III in discussing the privacy of communications, it is costly to avoid occasional
casual defamations in speech. To have to choose one's words very deliberately, to have to consider carefully the possible misconstructions that might be placed on words spoken about another person,
would reduce the effectiveness of oral communication. A requirement of deliberateness imposes fewer costs on written communications, because writing is a more deliberate process than speaking
anyway. The incremental cost of avoiding defamation in writing is
smaller than it is in slander.88
Second, written defamation is more durable than spoken. Even
if initially disseminated less widely than the spoken, it remains in
existence to be read later and so its total audience is apt to be
larger. A third point, related to the previous ones, is that a defamatory writing is more credible than a defamatory oral statement
and hence more harmful to the individual who is defamed. Precisely because the costs of attaining accuracy are lower in written
than in spoken communication, and the costs imposed by inaccuracy higher because of the greater durability and (probable)
greater audience of the written word, the reader has a greater expectation of accuracy in reading than he does in listening, and
will therefore tend to give greater weight to a libel than to a
slander. If damages for defamation were readily computable, this
difference would be reflected automatically in the damage awards
in libel and slander cases; but since they are not, the lower standard
for proof of defamation in libel than in slander cases seems sensible.
The defense of truth requires mention, if only because of the
frequent criticism that it is unfair for the law to treat truth as an
absolute defense."9 The harm to an individual from the revelation
of a true but perhaps minor or long-forgotten blemish in his character may, it is argued, outweigh any benefit from correcting the false
impression on which his reputation rests. The law has proved
stubbornly resistant to the suggested reform. Its response is consistent with the economic view presented in this paper. The law
will provide no protection to people, any more than to sellers of
88. This consideration suggests that the rule that a defamatory radio broadcast is
slander if the speaker is speaking extemporaneously but libel if he is reading from a manu-

script is not the "unctuous casuistry" that Donnelly terms it. Donnelly, supra note 75, at
123-24.
89. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Defamation, supranote 86, at 932.
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goods, who misrepresent their qualities in order to induce others
to enter into advantageous personal or business relationships with
them.
Other important defenses to defamation are grouped under
the rubric of privilege. There are both "conditional" and "absolute" privileges in defamation law. A conditional privilege entitles the defendant to make a false and defamatory utterance so
long as he is not motivated by "actual malice"; in practice this
means so long as he honestly, though perhaps unreasonably, believes the utterance to be true. An absolute privilege is good even
if actual malice is shown. A typical example of conditional privilege would be an employer's giving a character reference for a
former employee, and a typical example of absolute privilege
would be a critic's comment on a movie.90
The effect of privilege is to reduce the costs of making the
statements to which the privilege attaches. Why might the law
want to do that? One possibly relevant justification for allowing
a person to externalize some of the costs of an activity is that the
benefits of the activity are also externalized, so that if he is forced
to bear the full social costs he may not carry the activity to the
socially optimal point. This technique is occasionally employed in
the common law.' In the case of a character reference, the benefit
of the reference inures primarily to the employer receiving it rather
than to the employer giving it, and in these circumstances it is
predictable that if the former employer were liable for defamation
he either would not supply a character reference or would omit
from it any negative references to the employee's character. To be
sure, if he truly wanted an honest reference the prospective employer could compensate the former employer for the risk of
liability for defamation or the employee could waive his right to
sue for defamation. But either solution would involve heavy transaction costs relative to the values involved and as a practical matter
would eliminate most character references. The law's solution may
be the efficient one.
Most conditional-privilege cases are of this general sort, but
90. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment creates a conditional privilege to defame public officials. This

privilege was not a part of the common law and is not examined in this paper.
91. See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 417; Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders,
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7
LEGAL STUD. 83, 128 (1978).
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not all are. The conditional privilege that credit bureaus enjoy to
commit the aptly named "slander of credit"' 2 is difficult to explain
economically. There is no externalization of the benefits of a credit
bureau's activities-it charges its clients for its services. The conditional privilege of credit bureaus is a significant anomaly; it set
the stage for an important part of the privacy legislation discussed
in the next part of this paper.
The critic's absolute privilege rests on a completely different
ground, the absence of misrepresentation. If I say "Charlie Chaplin
is a crummy actor," or even "Chaplin can't act," I am expressing
a true (if silly) opinion rather than stating a false fact. Nor is my
opinion any less genuine, or more misleading, if it is the product
of a malicious dislike of the actor. Misrepresentation comes into
play only if the critic makes a false statement of fact, such as that
9 3
some author is a plagiarist.
To summarize, the basic doctrines of the defamation tort seem
generally consistent with the economics of the problem. But this is
not to say that economics can explain every outcome in a field of
the common law that, more than most, perhaps because of its
bifurcated historical origins (the tort of slander developed in the
medieval ecclesiastical courts, and that of libel in criminal proceedings in Star Chamber against seditious writings), contains many
anomalous features."4 In law, as in consumer behavior and every
other activity studied by economists, economics is more successful
in explaining central tendencies than in accounting for individual
decisions.

VI.

THE STATUTORY PRIVACY MOVEMENT

Many state and federal statutes relating to privacy have been
enacted in recent years. My previous article had little to say about
these statutes beyond observing that the general trend of legislative activity was at once to increase the privacy of individuals (by
privacy, meaning here the concealment of personal information)
and decrease that of business firms and other organizations, in92. See W. PROSsER, supra note 71, at 790.
93. See Fitzgerald v. Hopkins, 70 Wash. 2d 924,425 P.2d 920 (1967).
The other absolute privileges at common law mainly involve governmental (including

judicial) officials and are part of the larger tort immunity of governmental figures, a subject beyond the scope of this paper.
94. Enumerated and pungently denounced in Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of
Slander and Libel, 36 AM. L. Rav. 552 (1902).
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cluding universities and government agencies. I suggested that this
trend was perverse from an efficiency standpoint, since concealment of discreditable personal facts rarely serves a social purpose
whereas concealment in a business or organizational context often
serves to protect the incentive functions associated with entrepreneurial privacy and to shield communications, rather than just
to foster manipulation 5 I stand by this characterization, except
that I am persuaded by Professor Rubin that the government's
claims to privacy should be discussed separately from those of private business firms."6
I want to take a closer look at the statutes designed to protect
personal privacy from invasions by nongovernmental entities. Most
of these are state statutes limiting the kinds of information that
either an employer or a creditor can obtain (from any source) with
regard to the prospective employee or prospective borrower. In
the employment context, the emphasis is on limiting the employer's access to the employee's history of arrests and of remote
or "irrelevant" convictions. In the credit context, the emphasis is
on limiting the creditor's access to the prospective borrower's (adverse) credit history. These statutes differ widely in their details
and often a state will have an employment statute but not a credit
statute or vice versa. There is also a federal Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which bars creditors from inquiring about, or denying credit on
the basis of, bankruptcies of the prospective borrower that occurred
more than fourteen years earlier, or any other adverse information
relating to events (including arrests and convictions) that occurred
more than seven years earlier. This is the most important federal
statute directly regulating privacy in the private sector.98
There are several possible ways of trying to explain statutes
such as the above. One, the traditional but now rather discredited
approach of many lawyers and economists, is to suppose that the
statutes were enacted in response to some perceived "market fail95. See Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 404-06; Posner, An Economic Theory of
Privacy,supra note 1, at 25-26.
96. See Rubin, Government and Privacy: A Comment on "The Right of Privacy,"
12 GA. L. REv. 505 (1978); Part VII infra.
97. The statutes are listed and discussed in REORT or THE PRIVACY PROTECrON STUDY
COmmISsiON, app. I: Privacy Law in the States (G.P.O. 1977).
98. The Buckley Amendment (Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (1976)), regulating school records, applies to both public and private schools, so
that its major impact falls on public institutions. Many federal statutes, for example those
requiring extensive disclosures by corporations to their shareholders, affect privacy indirectly.
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ure" justifying public intervention. This approach does not get
one very far in the privacy area. There is no economic reason to
suppose that employers would demand from employees and job
applicants more information than was cost-justified in terms of its
benefits to the employer in screening out unsuitable employees.
As noted earlier, the common law courts (with the exception of
the California courts) have rejected the idea that a person is entided to conceal his criminal record, even one relating to the
distant past, because other people might react "irrationally" to its
disclosure." Any such argument would be particularly weak in the
context of employment, where competition exacts a heavy penalty
from any firm that makes irrational employment decisions. Regarding the credit statutes, it is true, as remarked earlier, that the
common law courts have unaccountably immunized credit bureaus
from slander-of-credit actions. But the way to solve this problem,
as routinely done by state legislatures in many other areas, is to
repeal the common law immunity. Or, if private defamation actions are considered an inadequate corrective to such slanders, the
negligent collection and dissemination of false credit information
could be punished criminally. To limit the true information that
a credit bureau may collect and disseminate is hardly an apt
solution.
If the privacy statutes cannot be explained by reference to a
failure of the private market, can they perhaps be explained by
reference to heightened public consciousness of the inequity of
discrimination? Economists have argued that much racial and
sexual discrimination may be the product simply of the costs of
information. 100 These costs may lead people to base judgments on
very limited data, including the average characteristics of the racial
group to which the individual being judged belongs. There is a
great national movement against discrimination, even of the efficient kind motivated purely by information costs, in the areas of
race and sex; and it is possible to argue that this movement has
increased public sensitivity to other instances in which crude
proxies are used to screen out applicants for jobs or credit. After
all, it is the same sort of injustice to deny a person a job because
of a flat rule against employing anyone who has a criminal record,
99. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
100. See, e.g., Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am. ECON.
Rav. 659 (1972).
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though careful investigation would have shown that this individual's criminal record ought not disqualify him from the job,101
as it is to deny a black a job because of the average qualities of the
blacks in the relevant employment pool.
The suggestion, in short, is that the concern initially focused
on black and (slightly later) female discrimination has stimulated
a broader compassion for victims of discrimination, which is now
recognized to occur every time a person is denied an advantage on
the basis of some general presumption that excludes consideration
of his individual circumstances. The difficulty with the "compassion" theory of the privacy laws is its far-reaching and unacceptable
implications. Since the costs of information are always positive and
often very high, it is impossible to imagine how society could
function without heavy reliance on proxies in lieu of full investigation of all relevant facts. If we are sorry for the man whose fifteenyear-old bankruptcy judgment bars him from obtaining fresh
credit, we should be equally sorry for the young man who is denied admission to the college of his choice because of his performance on a standardized test that may not accurately reflect his true
academic potential. The appeal to our compassion is as strong, yet
the current trend in education is, of course, back to heavier reliance
on test scores.
Another possibility is that the privacy statutes are a response
to the pressures of some interest group more compact than the
public, or the altruistic public, at large. Much legislation has been
shown to be of this type. 102 However, with privacy as with other
broadly "consumerist" legislation, the benefited groups seem wholly
to lack the characteristics of an effective political interest group.
The benefited groups here are people with criminal records and
people with poor credit records. The former group is furtive, disreputable, and unorganized. The latter group is, if more numerous,
not compact in the ways identified by the interest-group theory as
favorable to effective political action. And it is probably less numerous than the group that consists of the people who will have to
pay higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the bad loans
101. An alternative rationale for facilitating the concealment of a criminal record,
based on the rehabilitation goal of criminal punishment, is discussed and rejected in Right
of Privacy, supra note 1, at 415 n.46. See also Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations,12 GA. L. Rav. 455, 471-74 (1978).
102. See, e.g., Jordan, ProducerProtection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of
Government Regulation, 15 J. LAv & ECON. 151 (1972); Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT Sc. 335 (1978).
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that they make because they are unable to obtain sufficient information with regard to the borrowers' creditworthiness: I mean
other marginal borrowers, as the most creditworthy borrowers will
tend to be selected into lower interest-rate categories.
A more plausible candidate for an effective interest group
beneficiary of the privacy laws is the blacks, whose political effectiveness in recent years seems well established. Imagine the following sequence. Blacks are discriminated against in credit and employment because (for whatever reason) their performance in these
areas is on average poorer than whites'. Some states (and the federal
government) pass laws to prevent discrimination against blacks.
Barred from using race as a proxy for employment suitability and
creditworthiness, employers and lenders cast about for other proxies
and settle on arrest records, conviction records, bankruptcies, judgments, and the like. They do this not because they are trying to
discriminate against blacks but because they want to screen out
(or into lower wage or higher interest-rate categories) people who
do not meet their qualifications for employment or credit at normal
prices. If, however, race is a pretty good (by which I mean accurate,
not ethically attractive or acceptable) proxy for the underlying
characteristics in which the employer and creditor are interested,
and if the substitute proxies (arrests, etc.) are also pretty good, then
the substitute proxies will have almost the same effect on the racial
composition of employees and borrowers as explicit use of the
racial proxy had. The ban on discrimination will have little practical impact.
In these circumstances the racial group may seek to bar the
substitute proxies as well. It is true that barring arrest records from
consideration in employment may result in a black who has no
arrest record losing a job opportunity to a black who has one, and
barring consideration of past bankruptcies may result in a black
who has no record of bankruptcy paying a higher interest rate
because creditors are unable to exclude blacks who do (assuming
a past bankruptcy increases the probability of a future one-which
presumably it does if creditors bother to ask about past bankruptcies). However, since a disproportionate number of black credit
applicants have poor credit records and a disproportionate number
of job applicants have arrest records, laws that wipe out these hurdles to obtaining credit and employment may benefit more blacks
than they hurt.
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A possible empirical test of this hypothesis is to compare states
that have enacted civil rights laws with states that have enacted
credit and/or employment privacy statutes. Landes' 1968 study of
employment discrimination identified twenty-nine states as having
enacted laws (with at least some enforcement machinery) forbidding racial discrimination in employment, twenty-one of them
before the enactment of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.103 A
1977 study for the Privacy Commission identifies eight states as
having enacted laws protecting the privacy of private-sector employees and job applicants.0 Six of these states (75%) are among
the twenty-nine states identified in Landes' study as having enacted antidiscrimination laws with "teeth," and five (63%) are
among the twenty-one "early" antidiscrimination states. Thus, a
state that enacted a nondiscrimination statute was somewhat more
likely to adopt an employee privacy statute than one that did not
enact a nondiscrimination statute. (If it were just as likely to adopt
such a statute, the above figures would be 58% and 42%, respectively.)
On the credit side, the analysis is complicated by the fact that
the federal government acted with respect to both discrimination
(in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act) 105 and privacy (in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act)' 06 before the states did. However, if we
continue to use the Landes list as indicative of states having a
strong civil rights movement even if they did not legislate specifically with reference to credit, then it is suggestive that of the
eleven states 07 that have enacted credit privacy restrictions more
stringent than the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (which was
not preemptive in this regard), nine (82%) are on Landes' list
and six (55%) are among the twenty-one early enacters on that
list. This is further evidence that a state that has a strong antidiscrimination policy is likelier than a state that does not have
such a policy to pass a privacy statute.
103. Landes, The Economics of FairEmployment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507, 507 n.1
(1968).
104. See Privacy Law in the States, supra note 97, at 17-19.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Incidentally, the legislative history of this important
privacy statute indicates a concern that unregulated disclosure of adverse information to
creditors could have a disproportionately adverse effect on blacks. See Fair Credit Report.
ing: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutionsof the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 129-32 (1969).
117. See Privacy Law in the States, supra note 97, at nA7.
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I performed another pair of empirical tests using a slightly
different body of data, a very recent and thorough compilation of
state and federal privacy statutes by Robert Smith.0 8 He divides
privacy statutes into fifteen categories and notes which state (or
the District of Columbia, or the federal government) has enacted
a law in each category. 0 9 Again using Landes' data and dividing
states (including the District of Columbia) into those that enacted
fair employment practices laws before 1964, those that enacted
them afterward, and those that did not enact them (within the'
period covered by Landes' study), one finds that the average number of categories in which a state has passed a privacy law is 6.9
for the early-enacting states, 6.5 for the late-enacting states, and
6.3 for the nonenacting states. These differences, although in the
predicted direction, are very small, perhaps in part because the
fifteen privacy categories in Smith's compilation include many
that have no obvious relationship to the distinct interests of blacks,
such as wiretapping and Freedom of Information. If we confine our
attention to the three categories that seem by the earlier analysis
clearly related to the interests of blacks-privacy of arrest records,
credit information, and employment records-the above figures
change to 1.10 (early-enacting states), 1.00 (late-enacting), and .78
(nonenacting)."10
Although the results of the foregoing tests suggest (though not
at accepted levels of statistical significance) a linkage between civil
rights laws and an important subset of privacy laws, they do not
provide unambiguous support for the interest-group theory advanced in this section of the paper because they are equally consistent with the hypothesis that both antidiscrimination and privacy
statutes are motivated by compassion-but compassion for blacks
rather than for poor credit risks, and ex-convicts, as such. A way to
distinguish between these alternative hypotheses is to examine
the correlation between the presence of a privacy statute and the
number of blacks and Hispanics (the two major minority groups
that are probably most benefited by the privacy statutes in ques108. R. SMiTH, COMxLAnON

OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAws 1978-79 (1978).
109. See id. at 2.
110. The federal government is not included in these statistics. In the 15-category
analysis the federal government's "score" is 9, considerably above the average of the earlyenacting states, but in the 3-category analysis the federal government's score is 1, identical
to that of the late-enacting states-which makes sense since the date of the first federal
civil rights act of modem times-the Civil Rights Act of 1964-was used as the break point
to divide the early- from the late-enacting states.
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tion). If the correlation is positive, that is evidence for an interestgroup explanation; if negative, for a compassion explanation
(because the cost of compassion is lower, the smaller the benefited
group). If there is no correlation, that is evidence against either
interpretation.
Table 1 attempts such a correlation. The fifty states are divided
into four categories-states that have laws in each of the three
relevant categories of privacy statutes (arrest, credit, and employment); states that have laws in two; in one; and in none. The
unweighted average percentage of blacks and Hispanics in each
category of states is then calculated.11' The results provide some
support for the interest-group theory. The percentage of blacks
and Hispanics rises as one moves up the ladder from states with no
privacy statutes in the relevant categories to states with statutes
in all three categories.
TABLE 1*
CORRELATION

OF STATE PRIVACY STATUTES

WITH PERCENTAGE BLACK AND MEXICAN IN STATE

Number of Privacy-Law
Categories in Which State
Has a Statute (Number of
States)

Percentage Black and Mexican
In State
(average for nation: 9.2)

3

13.1

(3)
2
(7)

1

10.7

8.7

(24)
0
(16)

8.5

The empirical tests thus provide some support for the hypothesis that an important subset of privacy statutes may be ex*Sources: Robert Ellis Smith, Compilation of State and Federal Privacy Laws 1978-79, at 2
(1978); U.S. BUR. oF THE CENSUS, STATisrICAL AnsmrAr OF THE UNITED STATES:1977, at 31, 35.

111. As my measure of the I-Ispanic population, I used Mexican parentage. This
measure tends to bias the results in Table 1 against the interest-group hypothesis, since
it excludes both Puerto Ricans (heavily concentrated in New York State, which is in the

second-highest privacy category), and Mexican-Americans whose parents were born in this
country (heavily concentrated, judging by the distribution of the population having Mexican parentage, in four states of which three are in the two highest privacy categories).
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plained, somewhat surprisingly, in terms of the interests of the
black and Hispanic communities. However, the support is weak.
None of the results, standing alone, is statistically significant. To
be sure, where a series of statistical tests all point in the same
direction, the significance of the series may be greater than the
significance of each test result evaluated by itself. But where, as
here, the samples on which the tests are based are not completely
independent, the determination of the significance of the series is
elusive. The picture is further completed by the results of some
other statistical tests." In sum, the evidence presented in this section is best regarded as suggestive.
Although the approach taken here does not treat the privacy
movement as a unitary phenomenon resulting from the activities
of one political interest group, but instead breaks out one set of
privacy statutes and seeks to explain just that set with reference
to the interest groups benefited by them, I see nothing improper
with this approach in principle. There is no basis for a presumption that, from the standpoint of political demand, privacy is a
unitary phenomenon. To be sure, I earlier suggested that a combination of the rising demand for privacy (based on its characteristic as a superior good) and the recent dip in the costs of invading privacy as a result of technological advances in electronic surveillance and electronic data storage and retrieval might be relevant
to explaining the movement for privacy legislation; however, that
is not a promising alternative explanation with regard to the particular privacy statutes under discussion. Viewed from the standpoint of society as a whole, placing limitations on employers' and
creditors' access to information is not even a zero-sum game; it is
112. Claire Friedland reran the correlation reported in Table 1 with certain modifications in the statutory classification and using a different measure of Hispanic population.
Her results were qualitatively similar to mine and statistically significant.
George Stigler, in his unpublished paper, Privacy in Economics and Politics (Jan.
1979), finds (at tab. 3.2) that votes in the House of Representatives on the Privacy Act of
1974 were positively correlated with percent black and Hispanic in the Congressman's district, after correcting for differences in per capita income and in education across districts.
The positive correlation remained when an urbanization variable was added to the regression, but was no longer statistically significant. The rationale for including an urbanization variable, however, is unclear to me.
Finally, I reran the correlation in Table 1 using the employment and credit statutes
listed in the Privacy Commission's report, note 97 supra. The employment statutes were
strongly positively correlated with percentage black and Hispanic: the unweighted average

black and Hispanic population in the eight states in this category was 11.1%, well above
the unweighted average of all the states (9.2%). But the unweighted average for the 11
states that enacted credit protections going beyond the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
was only 7.4%, well below the average of all the states.
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a negative-sum game because, putting aside the occasional errors
that are better corrected by repealing the common law immunity
against slander of credit or by expanding public officers' liabilities
for false arrest, the effect of such statutes on the public as a whole
is to increase the amount of fraud in society, raise interest rates,
and reduce business productivity. However, the statutory restrictions increasingly being placed on the retention and dissemination
of private information by the government may be a response to a
broad public demand for greater privacy based on the growth in
incomes (which has shifted the demand curve for privacy to the
right) and the reduction in the costs of invading privacy (which
has moved the supply curve for privacy to the left), for, as we are
about to see, there is no presumption that governmental infringements of privacy are optimal.
VII.

GOVERNMENT AND PRIVACY

My previous paper made a few casual and, as Professor Rubin
has pointed out, erroneous" 3 references to the government as a
possessor of privacy and as an invader of its citizens' privacy. I said
that as a possessor of privacy government should be treated like a
private business organization, and its communications and its
"innovative" facts (if any) shielded from involuntary disclosure.
With regard to the government as invader of privacy, I said that
the growth of occupational mobility, urbanization, and so on had
resulted in the government's having less information about individuals than it used to. Rubin made two important points: first,
that the government has different incentives from private firms
and, specifically, might want to conceal information about its operations from an electorate whose incentives to inform itself about
the government's operations are already weak; second, that the
growing activity of the government as tax collector (from individuals), employer (especially in wartime), and social insurer had
given it vastly greater information about people than it used to
have. I accept these points-and their implication that the issues
raised by governmental claims of and alleged invasions of privacy
are so different from those raised by private claims and invasions
that the two domains of privacy cannot be discussed as one. This
in itself is a significant point. Those who propose restricting the
113.

See note 96 supra.
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collection, retention, and dissemination of information by private
firms and institutions, such as credit bureaus and private employers,
often try to bolster their case with examples of governmental invasions of privacy (or excessive claims of governmental privacy)without recognizing that government behavior in the privacy area
may raise different issues from the behavior of nongovernmental
entities.
The government's claim for privacy, for example, is both different from and normally weaker than that of private entities. One
of the privacy interests discussed earlier in this paper-seclusion
-has no application to a government agency, or to the leading
agents. Whether elected or appointed, the modern politician is
unlikely to be a person of retiring disposition, though he may need
occasional peace and quiet to plan his work.114 Nor is the concept
of privacy as innovation broadly applicable to the government,
since, with the important exception of security, both domestic and
foreign, the government does not engage in entrepreneurial activity. Sometimes the government finds itself a custodian of private
information, as where it obtains some firm's trade secret in the
course of carrying out a statistical or law enforcement activity.
Here the claim of privacy, though nominally asserted by the government, is really the claim of some private entity. 1 5
To the government's claim to informational privacy in the
areas of (1) security, and (2) information obtained from private
parties that would be entitled to protection were it still in their
hands, it might seem we should add the government's claim to
conversational privacy. It is true that if government conversations
were public, the effectiveness of communications within the government, and hence the ability of the government to carry out its
duties, would be impaired. But efficiency in government, if defined
as minimizing the costs of implementing government policy, is not
an unalloyed virtue; if it were, the principle of separation of
powers, which is inefficient in that narrow sense, would be rejected." 6 The value of publicity of governmental communications
in deterring plots against the public might be greater than the cost
114. To be sure, politicians' very lack of privacy may result in a self-selection toward
people lacking much sense of privacy.
115. This is not to say the government may not have a strong incentive to preserve the
privacy of such information: the costs of collecting income tax are inversely related to the
confidentiality of income tax returns.
116. See R. PosR, supra note 5, at 492-93.
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in reduced efficiency of government, though I will not attempt to
evaluate this trade-off here.
Let us turn to the role of the government as a pryer into the
secrets and conversations of its citizens. In some areas the government's need for information parallels that of private entities. For
example, the government is a very large employer and has a legitimate interest in checking the background of prospective employees.
However, the variance in the amount of information demanded by
governmental employers of prospective employees is probably
greater than in the private sector, holding constant any differences
in job specifications. For some jobs, especially in the federal government, the government snoops more intrusively into the prospective employee's background, associations, etc., than a private
employer would do for a job of equivalent responsibility. Other
jobs are handed out with less regard for the prospective employee's
competence or character than a private employer would have. The
reason for the greater variance in the public sector is that public
employment is a political activity rather than purely a means of
carrying out the agency's responsibilities, and is only weakly constrained by efficiency considerations.
Most of the controversy over government as snooper involves
the exercise of the government's law enforcement functions. I suggest that the principal issue for policy is the substantive merit of
the law being enforced. The clearer it is that the forbidden conduct
is antisocial, the more willing we are to allow the government to
obtain private information, through eavesdropping, informers,
interrogation, searches, and other means, regarding that conduct.
The most reprobated instances of the use of informers and other
methods of surveillance by government, whether the government
of ancient Rome or that of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union,
n7
are ancillary to the enforcement of unpopular or offensive laws.
A related point is that excessive snooping by the law-enforcement
arms of government is more or less proportional to the extent of
public regulation. If the government interests itself in a very small
part of private behavior-say, coercion plus evasion of the (modest)
taxes necessary to support a government whose only substantive
concern is with the prevention of coercion (external or internal)then the measures it takes to unmask antisocial activity will tend
to be extremely limited (save in crisis periods, when the populace
117. On Rome, see A. WESTIN, supra note 53, at 50, 52-53.
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will probably welcome extreme measures). It is only when the state
becomes involved in regulating private consensual behavior, such
as drinking or taking drugs or lending money at high interest rates
or prostitution or political discussion, that its ancillary surveillance
activities become oppressive.
The foregoing remarks can perhaps be clarified by discussion
of three particularly controversial methods of obtaining evidence
or leads for public prosecutions: electronic eavesdropping (wiretapping and bugging), the use of undercover informants, and the
extraction of confessions by intensive interrogation.
A.

Electronic Eavesdropping
If eavesdropping could be precisely targeted on conversations
plotting illegal conduct, the concern with this surveillance technique would be much reduced. It is true, as explained in Part III
of this paper, that eavesdropping increases the cost and reduces the
effectiveness of communication; but this fact is converted from an
objection to eavesdropping into an argument for its use once it is
conceded that the conversation is part of the illegal behavior that
society is properly interested in discouraging. The analogy would
be to the seizure of contraband, the least controversial (and most
clearly permitted by the fourth amendment) form of search and
seizure. The case for eavesdropping on conversations that merely
reveal past illegal conduct, like the parallel case for seizures of
evidence of past crimes as distinct from contraband and actual fruits
of crime, is weaker because, by the argument in Part III, its principal effect is simply to induce circumspection in conducting the
illegal activity so as to leave no traces.
Eavesdropping cannot, however, be neatly targeted on actual
plottings, but is bound to pick up other conversation as well. Moreover, to be fully effective, eavesdropping has to be conducted on
suspects, some of whom are innocent, and not just on obvious offenders (if the offense is obvious, the value of the eavesdropping is
merely cumulative-unless it discloses new suspects). So a substantial and costly impediment to effective communication for lawful
purposes is created. But again the scope of government is an important factor in evaluating this surveillance method. With limited
government the occasions for electronic surveillance would be
many fewer than they are today because the range of potential suspects would be much narrower. It is logical for the Soviet government to wiretap the telephones of intellectuals and our government
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those of "baby brokers" and loan sharks, but a government that
relied more on the private market to regulate behavior, and less
on the state, would have no incentive to tap these phones.
B.

UndercoverInformants

Informers are commonly hated because they are so often hired
to enforce laws regulating private consensual behavior. It is these
laws, the source of "victimless crime," whose enforcement requires
planting an informer-there is not a complaining witness otherwise.
The informer has much the same effect on communications as
electronic surveillance does. In ancient Rome, as mentioned earlier,
the servants of the rich were often employed as undercover agents
by the police to spy on their employers. Since the police were looking mainly for evidence of subversive opinions, the effect of the
servant-informer network was similar to the use of wiretaps and
bugs by a modem totalitarian state. Given the parallel between the
informer and the bug, the lack of any constitutional or statutory
limitations on the planting of informers among suspect groups is
hard to square with the extraordinary restrictions with which the
118
use of electronic eavesdropping is hedged about.

C.

Confessions

The fifth amendment provides that no individual may be
forced to incriminate himself. This provision entitles criminal defendants not to take the stand, and the witness in any type of proceeding not to give testimony that could lead to his conviction for
a criminal offense. The policy of the fifth amendment is also used
to bar the introduction in a criminal trial of a confession of the
defendant that was obtained by torture or other coercion. Among
the various arguments given for the privilege against self-incrimination, 119 the most common is that it is necessary in order to protect
people from being coerced into giving false confessions. However,
this argument is answered by requiring that the confession be
corroborated or otherwise validated independently.
I want to suggest-without attempting to develop a point
whose proper elucidation would carry me far beyond the scope of
118. This is a major theme in Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy
and Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 Am. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 1193.
119. Reviewed in C. MCCORuCK, supra note 35, at 251-54.
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this paper-that the persistence of the privilege is related to the
scope of government and that in a system of truly limited government the privilege would lack vitality. I am suggesting, in short, a
connection between Bentham's advocacy of limited government
and his desire to abolish the privilege. In a system that punished
only a limited set of primarily coercive acts, a requirement that
confessions be corroborated would go far toward eliminating the
objections to compulsory self-incrimination. But governments are
in fact prone to punish a very broad range of behavior and even
thought, including the harboring of hostile feelings toward the
government and refusal to conform to specified religious beliefs.
Offenses so gossamer often cannot be corroborated even in principle, so that if forced confessions are permitted there is no external
check on their validity.2 0 The confessions of the victims of Stalin's
purges were of this nature. As late as Blackstone's time it was a
capital crime in England to "compass" (that is, imagine) the death
of the king. And the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination apparently arose in England in protest against proceedings in
Star Chamber and other tribunals concerned with political and
religious offenses.' 2 ' In sum, the privilege may be designed less to
vindicate ideals of procedural justice than to complement other
provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights limiting the scope
of government regulation in tln .area of belief.

120. See E. GiusWoLD, THE FiF=n

AMENDMENT TODAY 8-9 (1955).
See L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FFrH AMENDIENT: THE RIGHT
CRIMINATION 801-13; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 85, at 244-46.
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